



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**REDUCING THE USE OF FORCE: DE-ESCALATION
TRAINING FOR POLICE OFFICERS**

by

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September 2016

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**REDUCING THE USE OF FORCE: DE-ESCALATION TRAINING FOR POLICE
OFFICERS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

The use of force by police officers has captured the attention of society. Allegations of inappropriate or misapplied force happen with regularity. This thesis conducted a survey of the members of the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training to determine the number of training hours dedicated to firearms and force versus de-escalation topics. It analyzes the results through the framework of the Recognition-Primed Decision model, which asserts that in rapidly evolving, time-limited incidents, individuals make decisions based on prior experiences. This thesis hypothesizes that officers are primed to use force rather than de-escalation options due to an overemphasis on force during training sessions. The survey results showed an 8.9 to 1 ratio of training hours on force versus de-escalation. It recommends that police trainers strive to achieve parity in training hours dedicated to force and de-escalation topics. It also recommends that scenario-based training be emphasized to provide experiences to draw upon, and that the scenarios mirror real-world probabilities. Positioning Theory, Crisis Intervention Team principles, and de-escalation strategies of other countries are also examined for methods that could be implemented to reduce the occurrences of inappropriate use of force by police officers.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALADS	Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs
CDMM	Critical Decision-Making Model
CIT	Crisis Intervention Team
FBINAA	Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Associates
IACP	International Association of Chiefs of Police
IADLEST	International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDM	National Decision Model
PERF	Police Executive Research Forum
PT	Positioning Theory
RPD	Recognition-Primed Decision
RT	Role Theory
UCR	Uniform Crime Report

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
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Beginning in 2014, there has been a fevered national conversation about the use of force by police officers. The ubiquity of public and private video cameras has flooded social and traditional media with recordings of officers using force against citizens. The wide dissemination of video recordings that cast law enforcement in a negative light has led to public outcry for substantive changes to the manner in which officers use force against citizens. In answer to the demands for a transformation of how police use force, this thesis proposes modifications to the training curriculum delivered to law enforcement officers.

In 2015, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) conducted a survey of 280 law enforcement agencies to determine the number of training hours recruit academies assigned to use of force topics versus de-escalation topics.¹ The results of the PERF survey found that for every one hour of training devoted to studying de-escalation techniques, there were eight hours of training dedicated to learning about using some type of force.² This thesis conducted a similar survey with the members of the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST). The executive over police standards and training in each state in the United States is a member of IADLEST. The survey administered to the IADLEST members resulted in an 8.9 to 1 ratio of training hours of force to de-escalation. Both the PERF survey and the IADLEST survey show a gross imbalance in what is emphasized during police recruit training. The results of the PERF and IADLEST surveys are graphically displayed in Figure 1.

¹ “Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, August 2015, 11, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf>.

² Ibid.



PERF data obtained from PERF report.³

Figure 1. Aggregation of PERF and IADLEST Surveys.⁴

Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) was applied to the results of the PERF and IADLEST surveys to gain understanding as to why some police officers might inappropriately use force. The RPD model claims that in time limited and volatile situations, individuals naturally make decisions based on prior experiences.⁵ Individuals quickly assess the situation, recall previously encountered situations of a similar nature, and select a course of action based on the prior occurrences that have had successful outcomes.⁶ Analyzing the results of the PERF and IADLEST surveys through the RPD framework supports the hypothesis that police officers are primed to use force options instead of de-escalation techniques since force is overemphasized during training.

³ Adapted from “Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, August 2015, 11, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Gary A. Klein, “Naturalistic Decision Making,” *Human Factors* 3, June 2008, 456–460, doi: 10.1518/001872008X288385.

⁶ Gary A. Klein, “Recognition-Primed Decision,” Gary A. Klein Associates Inc., Fairborn, OH, 138, http://www.ise.ncsu.edu/nsf_itr/794B/papers/Klein_1989_AMMSR_RPDM.pdf.

Based on the results of the surveys and the analysis using the RPD framework, this thesis recommends achieving parity between force and de-escalation training hours in police recruit training and in-service training. It also suggests an emphasis in role-playing exercises focused on successful application of de-escalation strategies to provide officers with an experience base to draw upon when they are confronted with volatile encounters with citizens.

This thesis covers other subjects related to the use of force by police officers, one of which is Positioning Theory (PT). PT describes how individuals assume and project rights and duties to one another during encounters.⁷ The principles of PT bring understanding to human interactions and provide strategies to promote peace rather than foment conflict.⁸ This thesis also reviews the warrior versus guardian debate through the lens of PT.⁹ An argument is made that neither label should be applied to police officers. Ascribing equal rights and duties to all members of society eliminates in-group versus out-group divisiveness fostered by superordinate labels.¹⁰

The de-escalation techniques of the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model are evaluated to ascertain if all law enforcement officers could benefit from using them. However, this thesis found that current research does not support their effectiveness in reducing the force use by police officers during confrontations with individuals suffering mental health crises.¹¹ No research has been

⁷ Fathali Moghaddam and Rom Harré, *Words of Conflict, Words of War* (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2010), 2.

⁸ Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity*, (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 8–9.

⁹ “The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,” Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 2015, 9 and 19, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.

¹⁰ Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 8.

¹¹ Sema A. Taheri, “Do Crisis Intervention Teams Reduce Arrests and Improve Officer Safety? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” *Criminal Justice Policy Review* (November 5, 2014): 79, doi: 10.1177/0887403414556289.

conducted to determine whether CIT techniques could be efficacious for general law enforcement purposes.

This thesis reviews the de-escalation strategies of other countries for possible adoption by the police in the United States. It is recommended that officers in the United States not implement an adapted model of the United Kingdom's National Decision Model (NDM) as proposed by PERF.¹² The availability of firearms in the United States versus the United Kingdom makes the complex NDM problematic for use in the United States.¹³ This thesis recommends adopting the principles of Project Beacon from Victoria (Australia), and emphasizing scenario-based training as is done in Tasmania (Australia).¹⁴

¹² "Guiding Principles on Use of Force," Police Executive Research Forum, January 29, 2016, 41 and 53, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf>.

¹³ Daniel W. Webster and Jon S. Vernick, *Reducing Gun Violence in America* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 186 and 191.

¹⁴ Tim Prenzler, Louise Porter, and Geoffrey P. Alpert, "Reducing Police Use of Force: Case Studies and Prospects," *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 18 (January 4, 2013): 350–352, https://www.academia.edu/19203155/Reducing_police_use_of_force_Case_studies_and_prospects.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The killing of an unarmed teenager by a Ferguson, Missouri police officer in August 2014 brought greater attention across the United States to the challenge of finding ways to reduce the amount of force used by law enforcement officers.¹ Various remedies have been suggested, such as mandating that police officers wear body cameras.² However, body-worn cameras are only a partial answer. They document events but do not provide alternatives to using force. A second response to the perceived misuse of force has been the prosecution of police officers for charges spanning the spectrum of battery to murder. Post-incident actions address alleged illegal behavior, but they are responses to inappropriately applied force rather than prevention strategies. Research needs to be conducted to help develop more effective methods and strategies to alleviate the instances of misapplied and excessive use of force.

Novice police officers learn how to handle real-world situations by acquiring skills in basic recruit academies. However, depending on what is emphasized during training, officers may develop a false sense of reality and an over reliance on skills that are not appropriate in every circumstance. For example, if firearms are predominately required to successfully resolve training scenarios, firearms might be what police officers instinctively use when hostile situations are encountered.

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) conducted a survey of 280 police agencies in 2015 that documented the gross imbalance of force training and de-escalation training in the United States.³ The PERF survey results revealed that the median number of hours new police recruits were taught about

¹ “Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, August 2015, 9, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 11.

force was 129 hours.⁴ On the other hand, police recruits were given a median number of only 16 hours to learn about de-escalation, or how to avoid using force.⁵

A. PURPOSE STATEMENT

The purpose of this study is to provide an analysis of the number of training hours given to new police officers on the topics of force and de-escalation. This is important because the content of training courses influences what tactics officers use during encounters with the public. It is theorized that if force tactics are the predominant skills taught in police training academies, officers will be primed to use force options rather than de-escalation techniques.

A survey similar to the PERF survey was conducted for this thesis with the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST). The results of the IADLEST survey and the PERF survey will be analyzed through the lens of the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model of decision-making. The premise of RPD is that individuals confronted with a time-limited, escalating situation will make decisions based on prior experiences that match or closely match the circumstances being faced.⁶ This thesis posits that police training should provide as many hours on de-escalation techniques as on force tactics so that officers have a broad range of effective skills to safely restore peace in tumultuous encounters.

This thesis also explores Positioning Theory (PT), Crisis Intervention Teams (CITs), and de-escalation strategies from other countries as possible methods that could be employed to reduce the use of force by police officers. Additionally, an examination of the warrior versus guardian debate will be conducted, and PT principles will be applied to bring a viable resolution to the

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Gary A. Klein, "Recognition-Primed Decision," *Gary A. Klein Associates Inc.*, Fairborn, OH, 142–143, http://www.ise.ncsu.edu/nsf_itr/794B/papers/Klein_1989_AMMSR_RPDM.pdf.

issue. The final purpose of this thesis is to propose strategies to effectively implement de-escalation training for police officers in the United States.

This thesis does not attempt to account for all variables in the diverse hostile situations experienced by law enforcement officers. An attempt to do so would be complex and impractical. Although it might not be possible to determine precise causation of misapplied force, it is possible to identify the basic elements of social interactions that are more likely to result in de-escalation rather than escalation. It behooves law enforcement practitioners to investigate and propose strategies and techniques that are safer for society and the police. Inaction or the maintenance of the status quo is unacceptable and contrary to the will of the public.

This research will not consider psychological causes that could influence the misuse of force by police officers. It will not examine possible triggers such as post-traumatic stress disorder, or deficient anger management skill sets, nor will it investigate therapies to address those issues. Although there has been ample research performed in the areas of treating and managing psychological disorders, this study will focus on training curricula that apply to all police officers, not just those who may be affected by mental health disorders.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

What impact could labels have on police behavior? Are the de-escalation techniques of the CIT program effective at reducing the use of force? Do other countries have de-escalation strategies that could be applied in the United States? What is the current state of de-escalation training in United States law enforcement agencies?

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

It is unknown whether PT has been previously used to analyze the interactions of officers and citizens. However, being able to discern how words are used to position individuals engaged in discourse might aid the police to

better assess contentious situations and provide strategies to peacefully resolve them. Additionally, understanding the principles of PT might provide a clearer understanding of how the application or assumption of labels influences behavior.

This thesis will examine the prevailing research related to CITs. More specifically, it will explore whether CITs have been effective at reducing the use of force during police interactions with individuals suffering mental health crises. If shown that they are efficacious, a recommendation will be made for all law enforcement officers to be taught the techniques. If the techniques are not shown to be effective, a recommendation will be made for a critical evaluation of the viability of the CIT program.

Law enforcement agencies in foreign countries have struggled to devise safer ways of policing their populations. Some of the methods they have created may be applicable and beneficial to police agencies in the United States. This thesis will review effective strategies to reduce the use of force developed by the United Kingdom and Australia. The desired end result is for a safer environment for police officers and the citizens they serve.

D. OVERVIEW OF THESIS CHAPTERS

Chapter II contains a review of the literature on PT, CITs, de-escalation—domestic and foreign—RPD, and theories of human behavior that could impede implementing change in law enforcement philosophy and training.

Chapter III consists of a review of how the warrior mythos may have been inculcated into police lore. A discussion of the warrior versus guardian debate and how PT could be applied to it will also be provided.

Chapter IV presents an analysis of force and de-escalation training. The results of the PERF survey are compared to the results of a survey conducted for this thesis with members of the IADLEST. The surveys' objectives were to determine the minimum number of training hours given to new police recruits in

force and de-escalation topics. The methodology and results of the IADLEST survey will be presented. An analysis and discussion of the PERF and IADLEST surveys' results will be offered in light of the framework of RPD.

Chapter V offers recommendations based on the findings of this thesis. It will suggest that an understanding of the principles of PT could result in less use of force and more peaceful encounters with citizens. It will also include recommendations for increasing de-escalation training for police officers based on the PERF and IADLEST surveys' results, which are congruent with the principles of RPD. Additionally, it will propose the rejection of some foreign methods to reduce the use of force but the adoption of others. Finally, it will propose strategies for overcoming opposition to increasing de-escalation training for police officers in the United States.

The discussion in Chapter VI lists areas for further research. It will recommend further research into CIT de-escalation principles based on actual incidents, utilizing control and experimental groups. It will also be suggested that studies be undertaken to determine whether CIT de-escalation techniques are effective at reducing the use of force not only with mentally ill patients but with the general population as well.

Chapter VII is the concluding chapter. It will summarize the pertinent findings of this thesis and provide an overview of the issues addressed.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review will provide an overview of Positioning Theory (PT) and how it describes rights and duties individuals assume and ascribe during encounters with others.⁷ PT offers a framework to analyze interactions between citizens and the police. Understanding the principles of PT could provide concepts that could augment de-escalation techniques.

Next, the available literature on Crisis Intervention Teams (CITs) will be examined. The curriculum taught to CIT officers focuses on how to de-escalate encounters with persons suffering mental illness emergencies and divert them from jail and into mental health facilities.⁸ However, its de-escalation techniques could be employed by all police officers to de-escalate volatile situations with all citizens. This literature review will present contemporary studies on the effectiveness of CIT de-escalation techniques to reduce the use of force.

A section of this literature review will look at police de-escalation strategies that have proven to be effective at reducing the use of force. Included in this section will be de-escalation strategies from foreign countries. Data and anecdotal evidence from domestic as well as foreign police agencies will be provided in this section.

This literature review will also provide background on the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model of decision-making. Building on the RPD background and overview, this thesis will propose that police training on force be analyzed through the RPD model. Understanding how rapid decisions are made in time-limited and demanding circumstances will support changing the way police officers are trained.

⁷ Fathali Moghaddam and Rom Harré, *Words of Conflict, Words of War* (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2010), 2.

⁸ Randolph Dupont, Sam Cochran, and Sarah Pillsbury, "Crisis Intervention Team Core Elements," The University of Memphis School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice CIT Center (September 2007): 14–15.

This literature review will also present theories on human behavior that could provide insight to possible resistance some police practitioners might have to implementing de-escalation strategies. For change to occur, implementation strategies need to be utilized to overcome possible opposition. Theories on human behavior need to be understood so that resistance can be countered.

A. POSITIONING THEORY

Georgetown University professor of psychology, Dr. Fathali Moghaddam, has authored multiple books and publications including several on PT. He defines PT as “how people use words (and discourse of all types) to locate themselves and others.”⁹ Words attribute responsibilities and roles to individuals interacting with one another.¹⁰ They can be used to assert or assign rights—what a person is owed by others, and duties—what a person owes to others.¹¹ Moreover, they can be leveraged to label individuals as part of the in-group or the out-group, and can elicit postures and positions that can sway the outcome of encounters.¹²

University of Wollongong professor G. Zelle credits Georgetown and Oxford University professor, Rom Harré, as being one of the initial developers of PT.¹³ In a research paper from 2009, Harré et al. explained that PT has been used as a framework to understand conflicts ranging from disputes among nations to quarrels between individuals.¹⁴ Its concepts have provided a framework to peacefully resolve disagreements, but it has also been exploited to

⁹ Fathali Moghaddam and Rom Harré, *Words of Conflict, Words of War* (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2010), 2.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ G. Zelle, “Exploring the Application of Positioning Theory to the Analysis of Organisational Change,” *Research Online* (2009): 2, <http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1614&context=commpapers>.

¹⁴ Rom Harré et al., “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” *Theory & Psychology* (2009): 5–31, <http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/19/1/5>.

engage in or perpetuate conflicts.¹⁵ However, most research on PT has focused on ways in which it can provide understanding and context of issues to bring about peaceful outcomes.¹⁶

PT is distinctive from the Role Theory (RT) framework found in traditional social psychology.¹⁷ Sociologist B.J. Biddle describes RT as “a theatrical metaphor” where individuals conform to particular “parts” and follow a “script” as established by society.¹⁸ He further explains that the RT framework encompasses three elements: “roles,” or set “characteristic behaviors,” “social positions,” defined as established “parts to be played,” and “expectations,” which are the demarcated “scripts for behavior.”¹⁹ While RT’s components are rigid and constant, Harré and Moghaddam assert that the elements of PT are “labile, contestable and ephemeral.”²⁰ PT’s framework accounts for dynamic, social interactions, between individuals, groups, or countries.²¹

According to Harré and Moghaddam, the Positioning Theory Triangle framework consists of, “storyline(s).” “position(s).” and “Illocutionary force(s).”²² Harré provides the following definition of a position. “A position in an episode is a momentary assumption or ascription of a certain cluster of rights, duties, and obligations with respect to what sorts of things a certain person, in that position,

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Rom Harré and Fathali Moghaddam, “15 Positioning Theory and Social Representations,” *The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations* (2015): 229, <http://fathalimoghaddam.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Social-Representations.pdf>.

¹⁸ B. J. Biddle, “Recent Development in Role Theory,” *Annual Review of Sociology* (1986): 67–92, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2083195>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Rom Harré and Fathali Moghaddam, “15 Positioning Theory and Social Representations,” *The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations* (2015): 229, <http://fathalimoghaddam.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Social-Representations.pdf>.

²¹ Rom Harré et al., “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” *Theory & Psychology* (2009): 5–31, <http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/19/1/5>.

²² Rom Harré and Fathali Moghaddam, “15 Positioning Theory and Social Representations,” *The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations* (2015): 229, <http://fathalimoghaddam.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Social-Representations.pdf>.

can say and do.”²³ In a law enforcement context, a police officer has the right to apprehend those he has probable cause to believe have committed a crime. Furthermore, from the officer’s position, the person alleged to have committed the criminal act has a duty to subject himself to arrest. However, the suspected criminal in the situation may assign rights and duties to himself and the police officer that are contrary to the officer’s position.

In addition to positions, another component of PT is speech acts, which are sometimes referred to as illocutionary forces or simply acts.²⁴ Speech acts are words and actions that provide context and meaning to developing interactions.²⁵ As background, the term “illocutionary forces” is taken from J. L. Austin’s lectures on the usage of words.²⁶ Austin differentiated phrases as locutionary, the precise meaning of a phrase; illocutionary, what was implied; and perlocutionary, the resulting action.²⁷ For example, a law enforcement officer may stop a motor vehicle operator for a violation and ask, “Do you have identification?” If the driver interprets the question literally, a correct response would be “yes” or “no.” However, the implied force of the officer’s question is for the motor vehicle operator to produce identification. If the driver produces a form

²³ Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, “The Discursive Turn in Social Psychology by Rom Harré,” *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 697, accessed June 25, 2016, http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/34093676/The_Handbook_of_Discourse_Analysis.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1469237656&Signature=Ep2uviC8ZxJohkG8OOPW4jwQsug%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DThe_Handbook_of_Discourse_Analysis_Edite.pdf.

²⁴ Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 106.

²⁵ G. Zelle, “Exploring the Application of Positioning Theory to the Analysis of Organisational Change,” *Research Online* (2009): 3, <http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1614&context=commpapers>.

²⁶ J. L. Austin, “How to do Things With Words,” Oxford at the Clarendon Press (1962), accessed June 25, 2016, http://pubman.mpdl.mpg.de/pubman/item/escidoc:2271128:3/component/escidoc:2271430/austin_1962_how-to-do-things-with-words.pdf.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 120.

of identification, he would be performing a perlocutionary act. Illocutionary acts can be in the form of questions, warnings, orders, and so forth.²⁸

In addition to speech acts and positions, storylines are the third component of PT.²⁹ Storylines are predicated upon local or mutually understood social conventions, customs, or ceremonies.³⁰ They shape the perceptions of individuals in a dialogue about how the events will likely unfold.³¹ Participants in a police interrogation understand that the detective will ask questions, which the person being interrogated may answer. Depending on his answers, charges alleging criminal conduct may be filed with the future possibility of prosecution and incarceration.

The three elements of PT—positions, illocutionary forces, and storylines—make up the three corners of PT's Positioning Triangle shown in Figure 1.³²




Figure 1. Positioning Triangle.³³

²⁸ Ibid., 98, 108.

²⁹ Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 105.

³⁰ Jaan Valsiner, *The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 198.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 105.

³³ Adapted from Nikos Bozatzis and Thalia Dragonas, "The Discursive Turn in Social Psychology," *Taos Institute Publication* (2011): 134, http://www.taosinstitute.net/Websites/taos/images/PublicationsWorldShare/DiscursiveTurn_f_v2.pdf.

According to psychologist Dr. Nikki Slocum-Bradley, the Positioning Triangle visually demonstrates the interconnectedness of the three elements and how they interrelate to one another.³⁴ Authors Bozatizis and Dragonas provide the explanation that an individual in an exchange with another person can alter any aspect of the Positioning Triangle, which could alter the course of events.³⁵ They define positions, and the other elements of PT, as being fluid, disputed, and momentary during any interaction, and add that rights and duties asserted and projected by one party might be denied and rejected by the other party.³⁶

To provide a law enforcement example, a police officer may assert a right to search a citizen's vehicle based on probable cause and ascribe to the individual the duty to submit to the search. However, the citizen may believe the officer's claim is illegitimate and refuse to comply. In response to the citizen attributing a conflicting duty to the officer, the storyline might develop from a search, to the arrest of the citizen for obstructing the officer in the performance of his duties. If that occurs, the police officer will most likely perform a speech act of informing the citizen he is under arrest.

Slocum-Bradley explains that conflict develops when storylines, positions, or illocutionary forces oppose one another.³⁷ While some conflict can be productive in effecting positive changes, it becomes destructive when violence emerges.³⁸ Recognizing and understanding clashing discursive actions can help resolve conflicts and promote peace through the implementation of countermanding positions, speech acts, and storylines.³⁹ An example of how

³⁴ Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 107.

³⁵ Nikos Bozatizis and Thalia Dragonas, "The Discursive Turn in Social Psychology," *Taos Institute Publication* (2011): 134, http://www.taosinstitute.net/Websites/taos/images/PublicationsWorldShare/DiscursiveTurn_f_v2.pdf.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 113.

³⁸ Ibid., 8.

³⁹ Ibid., 8.

discursive strategies have been implemented to resolve conflict is the “town versus gown” controversy between the students of Georgetown University and the residents of Georgetown.⁴⁰ Slocum-Bradley relays that one positive positioning tactic employed to attenuate the dispute was to position all parties as “citizens” with equal rights and duties as opposed to “students” and “residents” with differing rights and duties.⁴¹

Ascribing equal rights and duties to groups or individuals involved in a conflict is one discursive strategy listed by Slocum-Bradley in her book, *Promoting Conflict or Peace through Identity*.⁴² Her list of peace promoting actions is

- the equal allocation of rights and duties to groups of people;
- identifying people as members of the same group;

- characterizing certain individuals as problematic and the ‘majority’ of people as unified and harmonious;

- characterizing certain actions as ‘unintentional’;

- the attribution of benign motivations; and

- characterizing groups as weak when divided but strong when unified.⁴³

On the other end of the spectrum, Slocum-Bradley identifies conflict-fomenting practices as

- certain types of speech acts, including accusations, rebukes, lambasting, reproaches, belittlement, condemnations, censure, reprimanding, blaming and social obloquy;

- the assignment of discrepant rights and duties to different groups by allocating rights and duties according to criteria that are met by some persons but not others;

⁴⁰ Ibid., 114.

⁴¹ Ibid., 114.

⁴² Ibid., 8.

⁴³ Ibid., 9.

assigning stable traits to groups of persons, especially 'victim' and victimizer identities; and

undermining the legitimacy of other actors and their actions through various discursive techniques, including attributing malign intentions.⁴⁴

Zelle documents that PT was originally developed in the 1980s during research on gender differences.⁴⁵ Since that time it has been applied to a wide range of issues, from marketing merchandise to understanding the dynamics of organizational change.⁴⁶ More recently, Moghaddam and others have used the framework of PT to analyze world conflicts.⁴⁷ One example offered by Dufour, Goldberg, and Moghaddam is the interactions of the United States and al-Qaeda.⁴⁸ In the early 1980s the United States supported and advised groups that eventually came to form al-Qaeda in their fight against the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ Some estimate that besides training what became al-Qaeda's fighters, the United States provided funding of approximately \$20 billion to these forces in their fight against the Soviets.⁵⁰ President Reagan referred to them as "freedom fighters."⁵¹ After the war with the Soviets ended, and the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States focused on other foreign policy interests.⁵² The position ascribed to al-Qaeda by the United States changed after September 11, 2001, when President

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ G. Zelle, "Exploring the Application of Positioning Theory to the Analysis of Organisational Change," *Research Online* (2009): 2, <http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1614&context=commpapers>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Daniel J. Dufour, Rachel Goldberg, and Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend," *The Psychology of Friendship and Enmity: Relationships in Love, Work, Politics, and War*, 41–43, <http://fathalimoghaddam.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/The-Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 41.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 41.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 41.

⁵¹ Ibid., 42.

⁵² Ibid., 42.

George W. Bush declared al-Qaeda as “enemies of freedom.”⁵³ The rights and duties assumed by the United States towards al-Qaeda changed from friend to foe.

Harré et al. summarized how PT is applied to conflicts as follows, “Positioning theory focuses on bringing to light the normative frames within which people actually carry on their lives, thinking, feeling, acting, and perceiving—against standards of correctness.”⁵⁴ He asserts that altering a person’s position can change how that person acts and is perceived by others.⁵⁵ He concludes that having a diverse set of communicative skills to react to positions imposed by others can help alleviate a situation from collapsing into conflict.⁵⁶

According to Zaiser and Staller, de-escalation is founded on communication skills.⁵⁷ Learning, understanding, and applying the principles of PT could enhance communication techniques taught in de-escalation courses. It could also lead to a reduction of the use of force by police officers.

B. CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAMS

In the late summer of 1987, Memphis (Tennessee) police officers were called to a residence where an individual suffering from a mental health disorder was harming himself with a knife.⁵⁸ Upon arrival, the police found that no one’s safety was in jeopardy other than the unstable individual who was cutting

⁵³ Ibid., 42.

⁵⁴ Rom Harré et al., “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” *Theory & Psychology* (2009): 5–31, <http://tap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/19/1/5>.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Benjamin Zaiser and Mario S. Staller, “The Word is Sometimes Mightier Than the Sword: Rethinking Communication Skills to Enhance Officer Safety,” *Journal of Law Enforcement* 4 (July 2015): 3, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278028510_The_Word_is_Sometimes_Mightier_Than_the_Sword_Rethinking_Communication_Skills_to_Enhance_Officer_Safety.

⁵⁸ Betsy Vickers, “Memphis, Tennessee, Police Department’s Crisis Intervention Team,” *U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Assistance* (July 2000): 4, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182501.pdf>.

himself.⁵⁹ The officers ordered the individual to drop the knife, he lunged at them and they responded by discharging their firearms, which resulted in his death.⁶⁰ In answer to the public's outrage over the incident, the mayor of Memphis commissioned a task force to develop a method for safely dealing with individuals experiencing mental health crises.⁶¹ The task force was composed of mental health workers, law enforcement practitioners, and general community members.⁶² The CIT model was developed as a safe and effective method to deal with persons suffering from mental health emergencies.⁶³

Since their conception, CITs have proliferated in many communities throughout the United States.⁶⁴ The CIT model is a diversionary program that emphasizes the placement of individuals who are having mental illness emergencies into mental health care rather than into jail.⁶⁵ Under the Memphis CIT model, police officers volunteer to receive 40 hours of training in CIT principles, which include an overview of mental health illnesses, mental health care, and de-escalation techniques.⁶⁶ The Memphis CIT training schedule is illustrated in Figure 2.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Michael T. Compton et al., "A Comprehensive Review of Extant Research on Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Programs," *The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law* 1 (November 2008): 47, <http://www.jaapl.org/content/36/1/47.full.pdf+html>.

⁶⁴ Megan L. Davidson, "A Criminal Justice System-Wide Response to Mental Illness: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Memphis Crisis Intervention Team Training Curriculum Among Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers," *Criminal Justice Policy Review* (2016): 47, doi: 10.1177/0887403414554997.

⁶⁵ Michael T. Compton et al., "A Comprehensive Review of Extant Research on Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Programs," *The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law* 1 (November 2008): 47, <http://www.jaapl.org/content/36/1/47.full.pdf+html>.

⁶⁶ Melissa S. Morabito et al., "Crisis Intervention Teams and People with Mental Illness: Exploring the Factors That Influence the Use of Force," *Crime & Delinquency* (January 2012): 59, <http://cad.sagepub.com/content/58/1/57.full.pdf+html>.

TIME	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	
800	Administrative Tasks Welcome/ Overview	Mental Health Didactics Special Focus Issues	Mental Health Didactics Child & Youth Adolescence	Mental Health Didactics Special Focus Issues	De-Escalation Scenario-Based Skill Training	
830	Research and Systems CIT Overview	Personality Disorder	Autism Dev. Disabilities	PTSD		
900	Mental Health Didactics Severe, Persistent Mental Illness	Mental Health Didactics Cognitive Disorders Dementia Delirium TBI	Mental Health Didactics Psychopharmacology	Mental Health Didactics Special Focus Issues Suicide		
930		Site Visit	Mental Health Didactics Assessment and Commitment			Community Support Community Resources
1000				Law Enforcement Policy and Procedures		
1030	Mental Health Didactics Thought D/O Mood D/O	Law Enforcement Liability	Administrative Tasks Break			
Administrative Task Lunch 1200 - 1300						
1300	Mental Health Didactics Substance Abuse Issues Co-Occurring D/O	Site Visits	Community Support Advocacy/ Perspective Veteran's issues Homelessness Issues	De-Escalation Scenario-Based Skill Training	Community Support Advocacy/ Perspective	
1330						
1400						
1430			De-Escalation Scenario-Based Skill Training	Research and Systems Evaluation of Training		
1500	Mental Health Didactics Child & Youth, Adolescence					Administrative Tasks Graduation
1530						
1600	Community Support Advocacy/Perspective Cultural Awareness Diversity					
1630						
1700						

Figure 2. Memphis Model Training Schedule.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Source: "National Curriculum," University of Memphis CIT Center: A Resource for CIT Programs Across the Nation, accessed July 10, 2016, <http://cit.memphis.edu/curriculum.php?id=0>.

Police officers who complete the CIT course are designated to be part of the police response to calls involving individuals with mental illnesses.⁶⁸ CIT certified police officers are considered part of the mental health providers' community that delivers services to individuals and families suffering from mental health crises.⁶⁹ The Memphis CIT model's guidelines include a recommendation that police dispatchers receive a version of CIT training to learn how to recognize and elicit information from citizens requesting police assistance with mental health emergencies.⁷⁰ Additionally, mental health providers are encouraged to participate in "ride along" opportunities with the police to gain insight into the difficulties officers face when dealing with consumers of mental health services.⁷¹ The Memphis CIT program's procedures urge that policies be established to direct the police and mental health providers on the program's objectives.⁷² In her doctoral dissertation, Cindy Stewart claimed the overall "objectives of the Memphis Model are to help officers recognize symptoms of mental illness, increase their use of mental health alternatives to arrest, and promote the physical safety of both officers and mentally ill citizens during police interactions."⁷³

Law enforcement and mental health practitioners commonly accept the CIT model as an effective strategy to minimize force during police encounters involving individuals experiencing mental health emergencies. CITs have lofty

⁶⁸ Melissa S. Morabito et al., "Crisis Intervention Teams and People with Mental Illness: Exploring the Factors That Influence the Use of Force," *Crime & Delinquency* (January 2012): 59, <http://cad.sagepub.com/content/58/1/57.full.pdf+html>.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Randolph Dupont, Sam Cochran, and Sarah Pillbury, "Crisis Intervention Team Core Elements," *The University of Memphis School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice CIT Center* (September 2007): 12, <http://cit.memphis.edu/pdf/CoreElements.pdf>.

⁷¹ Ibid., 14.

⁷² Ibid., 10.

⁷³ Cindy Stewart, "Police Intervention in Mental Health Crisis: A Case Study of the Bloomington Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Program" (PhD diss., Indiana University, 2009): 1, https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/2022/8856/Stewart_indiana_0093A_10580.pdf?sequence=1.

goals of increased safety for officers and patients, enhanced empathy and understanding for mental illness, and more efficient avenues to deliver critical services to those in distress. Research has been conducted to ascertain whether CITs have achieved their designed purposes. This literature review will focus on the research that has been conducted pertaining to the CIT's objective of reducing the use of force through de-escalation.

In 2009, Compton et al. used surveys to study the effectiveness of CITs.⁷⁴ The officers' completing the surveys gave their assumptions of actions they would take based on facts provided to them in a series of three hypothetical scenarios.⁷⁵ Some of the officers taking the surveys had received training in CIT and some had not.⁷⁶ After compiling the data, researchers found that both groups surmised that they would increase their use of force across the three scenarios.⁷⁷ However, the CIT trained officers chose actions of less force than non-CIT trained officers when dealing with the hypothetical psychotic individual in the third scenario.⁷⁸

Compton et al. held that officers trained in CIT principles were more confident than their counterparts that de-escalation techniques would resolve situations.⁷⁹ Although this study only considered hypothetical scenarios, researchers concluded that CIT training would attenuate the incidents of force perpetrated by police officers interacting with mentally ill subjects.⁸⁰ Compton et al. asserted, "Through the CIT curriculum, officers develop a deeper

⁷⁴ Michael T. Compton et al., "Use of Force Preferences and Perceived Effectiveness of Actions Among Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Police Officers and Non-CIT Officers in an Escalating Psychiatric Crisis Involving a Subject With Schizophrenia," *Schizophrenia Bulletin* 4 (2011): 737–745, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3122295/>.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 737.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 742.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

understanding of their own ability to positively impact the behavior of a person in crisis, moving toward de-escalation and away from use of force.”⁸¹

Compton et al.’s conclusions marginally support the premise that CIT de-escalation training is effective in reducing the use of force by police officers.⁸² However, the conclusions of the research were based on the officers’ beliefs of what actions they would have most likely taken based on the information provided in the vignettes.⁸³ The conclusions were not founded upon actual actions taken in real-world incidents, which limited the significance of Compton et al.’s results.

Out of all the studies reviewed during the research for this thesis, only one compared actual real-world incidents handled by CIT trained officers and non-CIT trained officers.⁸⁴ The study, conducted in 2012 by Morabito et al., compared the number of instances where force was used by CIT trained Chicago (Illinois) police officers versus those who had not received CIT training.⁸⁵ The results of the study supported the premise that CIT trained officers used force significantly less often than non-CIT trained officers as the mental health patients’ resistance increased.⁸⁶ However, Morabito et al. found surprising evidence that when CIT trained officers used force, they used “higher levels of force” than non-CIT trained officers.⁸⁷

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Melissa S. Morabito et al., “Crisis Intervention Teams and People with Mental Illness: Exploring the Factors That Influence the Use of Force,” *Crime & Delinquency* (January 2012): 57–77, <http://cad.sagepub.com/content/58/1/57.full.pdf+html>.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 62.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 70.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 71.

In 2010, researchers Oliva, Morgan, and Compton found that police officers intuitively use de-escalation methods in many situations.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the researchers posited that learning the de-escalation skills taught in the CIT curriculum could enhance police officers' instinctive abilities to proficiently and safely handle individuals in any type of situation.⁸⁹ While Oliva, Morgan, and Compton's conclusions are promising that CIT de-escalation techniques could be a solution to reduce the use of force, a study undertaken in 2014 by researcher Sema A. Taheri resulted in a different conclusion. Taheri's study attempted to ascertain whether evidence existed to justify the continuation of CITs.⁹⁰ Her investigation was based on an assessment made by J. L. Geller who retorted, "Although no one could be against encouraging this [CIT] education for officers, without more evidence of its effectiveness, it remains simply a blindly adopted novelty."⁹¹ Taheri researched publicly available automated records that contained data about CITs and CIT related research.⁹² Her study concluded that CIT training had no influence on the amount of force police officers used on individuals suffering mental health emergencies.⁹³

C. DE-ESCALATION

Academic studies focused on police de-escalation are predominantly associated with CIT. While there are several articles in media outlets and periodicals addressing de-escalation for police, this literature review found no scholarly studies focused on police de-escalation that did not mention the CIT model. Moreover, this literature review uncovered only two academic papers

⁸⁸ Janet R. Oliva, Rhiannon Morgan, and Michael T. Compton, "A Practical Overview of De-Escalation Skills in Law Enforcement: Helping Individuals in Crisis While Reducing Police Liability and Injury," *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations* (2010): 18. doi: 10.1080/15332581003785421

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁹⁰ Sema A. Taheri, "Do Crisis Intervention Teams Reduce Arrests and Improve Officer Safety? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis," *Criminal Justice Policy Review* (November 5, 2014): 79, doi: 10.1177/0887403414556289.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*, 80–81.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 86, 90.

addressing general police de-escalation and both included CIT principles in the discussion. One of the academic papers on police de-escalation, authored by Oliva, Morgan, and Compton, was referenced in the previous section. Former law enforcement officer Benjamin Zaiser and Dr. Mario Staller, an instructor of police force and firearms, conducted the other study found on police de-escalation.⁹⁴

Zaiser and Staller's prescriptive research contained a list of communication skills recommended for de-escalation similar to the list in Oliva, Morgan, and Compton's research.⁹⁵ Unlike Oliva, Morgan, and Compton's study, Zaiser and Staller included an adjustment of how police officers should perceive and respond to citizens, similar to concepts of PT.⁹⁶ They asserted that police officers should consider the people they encounter as equal citizens rather than antagonists.⁹⁷ They constructed a simple flowchart, shown in Figure 3, to illustrate their assertions.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Benjamin Zaiser and Mario S. Staller, "The Word is Sometimes Mightier Than the Sword: Rethinking Communication Skills to Enhance Officer Safety," *Journal of Law Enforcement* 4 (July 2015): 1–17, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278028510_The_Word_is_Sometimes_Mightier_Than_the_Sword_Rethinking_Communication_Skills_to_Enhance_Officer_Safety.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 10–11.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 6–9.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 9.




Figure 3. Flowchart of Police Officer Perception and Actions.⁹⁹

Criminal Justice professor Dr. Megan L. Davidson claims that statistics show individuals suffering from mental illnesses are involved in approximately seven to 10% of all police calls for service.¹⁰⁰ Morabito et al. affirmed that in all situations—inclusive of individuals who are and are not suffering from mental illness—police use force less than 1% of the time.¹⁰¹ Moreover, minor scrapes and contusions are the typical injuries sustained from use of force incidents involving the general population.¹⁰² However, the importance of providing police officers with effective de-escalation techniques and strategies cannot be understated.

⁹⁹ Source: Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Megan L. Davidson, “A Criminal Justice System-Wide Response to Mental Illness: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Memphis Crisis Intervention Team Training Curriculum Among Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers,” *Criminal Justice Policy Review* (2016): 47, doi: 10.1177/0887403414554997.

¹⁰¹ Melissa S. Morabito et al., “Crisis Intervention Teams and People with Mental Illness: Exploring the Factors That Influence the Use of Force,” *Crime & Delinquency* (January 2012): 60, doi: 10.1177/0011128710372456.

¹⁰² Ibid.

The studies documented in the previous section of this chapter suggest that CIT is not substantially effective at reducing the incidence of force. However, a few police agencies have observed reductions in the use of force and better outcomes through an increase in de-escalation training. One such agency is the Richmond (California) Police Department.

In a 2014 news article in the Contra Costa Times, reporters Rogers and DeBolt alleged that the Richmond police had not killed anyone for seven years.¹⁰³ The reason, they maintained, is because of training focused on reducing force and the use of less lethal weapons by Richmond officers.¹⁰⁴ According to Rogers and DeBolt, the Richmond Police Department implemented quarterly scenario-based training in 2008 that presented officers with de-escalation and force options.¹⁰⁵ From that time until 2014, Richmond police had less than one officer involved shooting per year, and no fatalities resulted from any of the shootings.¹⁰⁶ Conversely, from 2006–2007 Richmond police shot five people, including one that was mortally wounded.¹⁰⁷ It also vastly contrasts to the statistics of other police agencies near Richmond. For instance, Richmond lies within Contra Costa County. Between 2008 and 2013, Contra Costa County Sheriff's Deputies shot fifteen people, nine of them fatally.¹⁰⁸

While the quarterly scenario-based training sessions are seen as part of Richmond's success in reducing the use of force, there are other elements involved in achieving the results they have realized. Richmond Police instructor Lieutenant Louie Tirona asserted that their success "includes the rigor of training, the emphasis on communication with armed suspects, the thorough review of all

¹⁰³ Robert Rogers and David DeBolt, "Use of Deadly Force by Police Disappears on Richmond Streets," *Contra Costa Times*, September 6, 2014, http://www.eastbaytimes.com/news/ci_26482775/use-deadly-force-by-police-disappears-richmond-streets.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

force used and the philosophy that force must only be a last resort.”¹⁰⁹ In addition to Richmond’s significant accomplishments at reducing the use of force, it is also remarkable that no Richmond police officers were shot during the 2008 to 2014 timeframe.¹¹⁰

Dallas (Texas) Police Department has also claimed less force being used by their officers following de-escalation training.¹¹¹ In an article in *The Dallas Morning News*, Naomi Martin reported that in 2009, 147 complaints for excessive force were filed against Dallas police officers.¹¹² Following de-escalation training, only 13 such complaints had been levied against Dallas officers during the first 11 months of 2015.¹¹³ However, a criminal justice professor interviewed for the article was cautious about connecting the drop in complaints to the de-escalation training without additional research.¹¹⁴

D. DE-ESCALATION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

In addition to police agencies in the United States being confronted with calls for implementing de-escalation programs to reduce the use of force, foreign police agencies have faced similar situations. One country that United States law enforcers have looked to for ways to reduce the incidents of force is the United Kingdom. The two countries share a common history and a close relationship. Like the United States, police officers across the pond have experienced allegations of excessive force. In May of 2015, it was reported that 3,000 British

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Naomi Martin, “Dallas Police Excessive-Force Complaints Drop Dramatically,” *The Dallas Morning News*, November 16, 2015, <http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20151116-dallas-police-excessive-force-complaints-drop-dramatically.ece>.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

police officers were under investigation for police brutality.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, most police officers in the United Kingdom enjoy an overall positive image with their citizens.¹¹⁶

Unlike police in the United States, police in the United Kingdom experience fewer line of duty deaths. Four of the more than 160,000 police officers in the United Kingdom lost their lives in the line of duty in 2015.¹¹⁷ Out of the approximate 885,000 law enforcement officers working in the United States, 133 were killed in the line of duty in the same year.¹¹⁸ Based on the 2015 statistics, one out of every 40,000 police officers in the United Kingdom was killed in the line of duty. In the United States, one out of every 6,654 law enforcement officers was killed in the line of duty, which translates into policing in the United States being six times more dangerous than policing in the United Kingdom.

In 2015, a group of law enforcement executives from the United States visited Scotland in an attempt to ascertain how police in the United Kingdom work in relative security while routinely being unarmed.¹¹⁹ The United States officials found that police in Scotland use verbal de-escalation methods to calm volatile situations.¹²⁰ Additionally, they were told that Scottish police are not ashamed to retreat—or “tactically withdraw” as it was referred to—when it is appropriate.¹²¹ They also learned that the last time a police officer in Scotland

¹¹⁵ Paul Gallagher, “Over 3,000 Police Officers Being Investigated for Alleged Assault—and Almost all of Them are Still on the Beat,” *Independent*, May 1, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/over-3000-police-officers-being-investigated-for-alleged-assault-and-almost-all-of-them-are-still-on-10220091.html>.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Police Roll of Honour Trust, 2015, <http://www.policememorial.org.uk/index.php?page=roll-2015>.

¹¹⁸ Officer Down Memorial Page, 2015, <https://www.odmp.org/search/year?year=2015>.

¹¹⁹ Al Baker, “U.S. Police Leaders, Visiting Scotland, Get Lessons on Avoiding Deadly Force,” *New York Times*, December 11, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/nyregion/us-police-leaders-visiting-scotland-get-lessons-on-avoiding-deadly-force.html?_r=2.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

had been killed in the line of duty during a violent confrontation with a criminal was in 1994.¹²²

One member of the United States delegation to Scotland was Chuck Wexler, the executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).¹²³ After Wexler's visit to Scotland, PERF published 30 "Guiding Principles" on how police officers in the United States could use less force while working in their communities.¹²⁴ The 5th and 15th Guiding Principles contained the recommendation that all police departments in the United States adopt the Critical Decision-Making Model (CDMM), which was fashioned after the United Kingdom's National Decision Model or NDM.¹²⁵ The fourth standard of the 10 Standards of Professional Behavior that form the basis of the NDM is, "I will only use force as part of my role and responsibilities, and only to the extent that it is necessary, proportionate and reasonable in all the circumstances."¹²⁶ Charts of the CDMM and the NDM are shown in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ "Guiding Principles on Use of Force," Police Executive Research Forum, January 29, 2016, 1–136, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf>.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 41, 53.

¹²⁶ "National Decision Model," College of Policing, December 15, 2014, <https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/national-decision-model/the-national-decision-model/>.




Figure 4. PERF's Critical Decision-Making Model.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ Source: "Guiding Principles on Use of Force," Police Executive Research Forum, January 29, 2016, 27, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf>.



Figure 5. United Kingdom's National Decision Model.¹²⁸

The NDM was introduced to the United Kingdom's law enforcement officers in 2012.¹²⁹ It was developed from the Conflict Management Model, which was primarily a risk assessment tool.¹³⁰ The NDM was created at the urging of United Kingdom's Association of Chief Police Officers who wanted a decision-making framework that could be utilized in a variety of situations.¹³¹ Since its introduction, the NDM has been accepted as the national standard to be used by

¹²⁸ Source: "National Decision Model," College of Policing, December 15, 2014, <https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/national-decision-model/the-national-decision-model/>.

¹²⁹ Morgan Lax, "The Affective Domain and Police Values Education: Is the Former Used to Convey the Latter in Support of the National Decision Model?" *Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles* (2014): 126, <http://pdx.sagepub.com/content/87/2/126.full.pdf+html>.

¹³⁰ Keith Suddes, "Critical Thinking / Conflict Management Model," *Law Enforcement Today* (November 26, 2011), <http://www.lawenforcementtoday.com/2011/11/26/critical-thinking-conflict-management-model/>.

¹³¹ National Decision Model Explained, <http://www.nationaldecisionmodel.co.uk>.

all police officers in all situations.¹³² Although the NDM appears to be a valid system for decision-making, it is a complicated model that might not be efficacious in the rapidly evolving, dangerous incidents faced by law enforcement officers in the United States.

A major difference between the United States and the United Kingdom that has a profound influence on the choice of a decision-making framework is the elevated threat level from the proliferation of firearms in the United States. Handguns are banned in the United Kingdom and owners of rifles and shotguns must be licensed and prove a legitimate need to possess long guns.¹³³ Because there are significantly fewer guns available in the United Kingdom and ownership is strictly regulated, the most common weapon used against police officers is a knife.¹³⁴ It is reasonable to conclude that since knives are the primary weapons used by assailants in the United Kingdom, police have more time to use a complex decision-making framework like the NDM. On the other hand, law enforcers in the United States are faced with the fast and sudden threat of gun violence and would most likely be better served by following the philosophy of the RPD model of decision making discussed in Section E of this literature review.

Much like police in the United Kingdom, Australian police share a common background and philosophy with police in the United States. And, like the police in the United States, Australia's police officers have struggled with allegations of police brutality and excessive use of force.¹³⁵ The de-escalation efforts of the

¹³² "National Decision Model," College of Policing, December 15, 2014, <https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/national-decision-model/the-national-decision-model/>.

¹³³ Daniel W. Webster and Jon S. Vernick, *Reducing Gun Violence in America* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 186 and 191.

¹³⁴ Al Baker, "U.S. Police Leaders, Visiting Scotland, Get Lessons on Avoiding Deadly Force," *New York Times*, December 11, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/nyregion/us-police-leaders-visiting-scotland-get-lessons-on-avoiding-deadly-force.html?_r=2.

¹³⁵ Tim Prenzler, Louise Porter, and Geoffrey P. Alpert, "Reducing Police Use of Force: Case Studies and Prospects," *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 18 (January 4, 2013): 349, https://www.academia.edu/19203155/Reducing_police_use_of_force_Case_studies_and_prospe
[cts](https://www.academia.edu/19203155/Reducing_police_use_of_force_Case_studies_and_prospe).

Tasmania and Victoria police agencies are discussed in the following paragraphs.

1. Tasmania

Tasmania is an island state of the Commonwealth of Australia that is located off of the southeast corner of the main continent of Australia. Tasmanian police experienced an increase in use of force complaints that started in the mid-1990s and peaked around the turn of the century.¹³⁶ Over the next nine years, from 2000 to 2009, complaints of excessive use of force and assaults perpetrated by the police gradually declined from an average of 17 complaints per 100 officers to six complaints per 100 officers.¹³⁷

In analyzing the decline in citizen complaints, researchers Prenzler, Porter, and Alpert investigated plausible explanations to account for the drop in allegations against the police.¹³⁸ One theory they considered was the possible refusal by the Tasmanian police to accept or formally document complaints.¹³⁹ However, this hypothesis was invalidated because Tasmania has an independent Ombudsman who also receives citizen complaints against the police.¹⁴⁰ The Tasmania's Office of the Ombudsman experienced a parallel decline in complaints against the police during the same nine-year period the police department had a drop in complaints.¹⁴¹ Prenzler, Porter, and Alpert also speculated that complaints might have decreased due to a work reduction by the Tasmanian police.¹⁴² However, they found an increase in enforcement output by the Tasmanian police during the nine-year span of the study.¹⁴³

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 349–350.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 350.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

The probe into the most likely reasons for the decrease in citizen complaints led Prenzler, Porter, and Alpert to two primary factors that could account for the decline.¹⁴⁴ One plausible cause was the use of a “Job Suitability Test” to disqualify police candidates with undesirable characteristics.¹⁴⁵ The Tasmania Police recruitment literature does not describe what qualities the Job Suitability Test evaluates. Nevertheless, the Tasmania Police website lists five aspects of a candidate’s character examined by the suitability test: “problem solving ability, personality, opinions about society, work place procedures.” and “your personal history and opinion.”¹⁴⁶

The other factor that Prenzler, Porter, and Alpert concluded likely influenced the drop in citizen complaints was a substantial change in police training with a primary focus on de-escalation.¹⁴⁷ The Tasmanian training curriculum moved from a condensed defensive tactics course to a program taught over an extended period of time.¹⁴⁸ The new course emphasized de-escalation, communication and negotiation proficiencies, and included role-playing exercises and scenarios.¹⁴⁹ Researchers believe that these two changes—testing for job suitable characteristics and a significant revamping of the training regimen for recruits—likely accounted for the drop in citizen complaints.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ “Step 3—Fitness 7 Suitability Tests,” Tasmania Police, accessed March 7, 2016, <http://www.police.tas.gov.au/join-us/applications/step-3-fitness-suitability-tests/>.

¹⁴⁷ Tim Prenzler, Louise Porter, and Geoffrey P. Alpert, “Reducing Police Use of Force: Case Studies and Prospects,” *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 18 (January 4, 2013): 350, https://www.academia.edu/19203155/Reducing_police_use_of_force_Case_studies_and_prospects.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 351.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 350–351.

2. Victoria

Like police in the United States, Victoria (Australia) police officers routinely carry firearms.¹⁵¹ Nevertheless, police in the Australian state of Victoria rarely shoot and kill citizens during the course of their duties.¹⁵² From 1980 to 2005, Victoria police officers shot and killed an average of approximately two people per year.¹⁵³ However, in 1994, there were nine citizens killed by the Victorian police.¹⁵⁴ The surge in deaths led to public outcry and demands for dramatic changes to the manner in which the police officers in Victoria used force.¹⁵⁵ The graph in Figure 6 shows the number of individuals killed by Victorian police between the years of 1980 and 2005.¹⁵⁶




Figure 6. Number of Police Perpetrated Deaths in Victoria, Australia.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵¹ Jon Kelly, "Why British Police Don't Have Guns," *BBC News*, September 19, 2012, <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19641398>.

¹⁵² Christine Nixon and David Bradley, "Policing Us More Gently: An Australian Case Study on the Police Use of Force," *Police Executive Research Forum* (April 2007): 94, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/strategies%20for%20resolving%20conflict%20and%20minimizing%20use%20of%20force%202007.pdf.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Tim Prenzler, Louise Porter, and Geoffrey P. Alpert, "Reducing Police Use of Force: Case Studies and Prospects," *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 18 (January 4, 2013): 351, https://www.academia.edu/19203155/Reducing_police_use_of_force_Case_studies_and_prospects.

¹⁵⁷ Source: Ibid.

Faced with public outrage and a spike in deaths at the hands of the police, the Victoria Police instituted an overhaul to their use of force policy and procedures.¹⁵⁸ The overhaul was introduced in 1995 and was called Project Beacon.¹⁵⁹ When it was implemented, Project Beacon was based on 10 Operational Safety Principles rather than a use of force continuum.¹⁶⁰ The Operational Safety Principles, listed below, are still followed by Victoria's police officers today.¹⁶¹

1. Safety first — the safety of police, the public and offenders or suspects is paramount.
2. Risk assessment — is to be applied to all incidents and operations.
3. Take charge — exercise effective command and control.
4. Planned response—take every opportunity to convert an unplanned response into a planned operation.
5. Cordon and containment — unless impractical, adopt a 'cordon and containment' approach.
6. Avoid confrontation — a violent confrontation is to be avoided.
7. Avoid force — the use of force is to be avoided.
8. Minimum force — where use of force cannot be avoided, only use the minimum amount reasonably necessary.
9. Forced entry searches — are to be used only as a last resort.

¹⁵⁸ Christine Nixon and David Bradley, "Policing Us More Gently: An Australian Case Study on the Police Use of Force," *Police Executive Research Forum* (April 2007): 95, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/strategies%20for%20resolving%20conflict%20and%20minimizing%20use%20of%20force%202007.pdf.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Tim Prenzler, Louise Porter, and Geoffrey P. Alpert, "Reducing Police Use of Force: Case Studies and Prospects," *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 18 (January 4, 2013): 352, https://www.academia.edu/19203155/Reducing_police_use_of_force_Case_studies_and_prospects.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

10. Resources — it is accepted that the ‘safety first’ principle may require the deployment of more resources, more complex planning and more time to complete.¹⁶²

In addition to the 10 Operational Safety Principles, Project Beacon integrated scenario-based training in recruit and in-service training sessions.¹⁶³ Prenzler, Porter, and Alpert found that the training sessions included the acquisition of skills in “communication and conflict resolution” along with firearms proficiency and defensive tactics.¹⁶⁴ As illustrated in Figure 6, the rate of deaths caused by the police in Victoria significantly decreased after Project Beacon was implemented.¹⁶⁵ At first glance, the principles of Project Beacon appear to hold potential for reducing police applied force in the United States. While that may be true, the Victoria Police experienced a slight resurgence of citizen deaths at the hands of the police beginning in 2003.¹⁶⁶ After analyzing the increase in deaths, the Victoria Office of Police Integrity concluded,

It appears that Victoria Police has lost some of the strategic focus on safety and avoiding the use of force [sic] which it developed during Project Beacon... The result is a lack of effective risk management, a culture in which self-assessment, review and improvement are given insufficient attention, and a diminution of essential police training.¹⁶⁷

Should police agencies in the United States adopt a strategy of de-escalation similar to Victoria's Project Beacon, leaders must remember to continually emphasize and train on the new strategy and techniques to keep them current in the minds of their officers.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 351.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 352.

E. RECOGNITION-PRIMED DECISION

Police officers are occasionally faced with rapidly developing, volatile situations that require quick decisions and decisive action. As was discussed in the previous section, complex decision-making models are not beneficial to officers in the United States due to the proliferation of firearms. Law enforcement practitioners need a framework that explains how potentially momentous decisions are made when time is short. That framework is found in the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model introduced by Dr. Gary Klein.¹⁶⁸

Klein was a former research psychologist for the United States Air Force who theorized that individuals in rapidly evolving environments make decisions based on prior experiences that match or closely match the elements of the situation at hand.¹⁶⁹ The individual making the decision assesses the circumstances and plausible outcomes, and selects a course of action that has proven successful in the past.¹⁷⁰ Klein posits that the RPD model is a “recognitional” rather than an “analytical” decision-making process, meaning decisions are based on past experiences rather than on a comprehensive analysis of available future-oriented options.¹⁷¹ He acknowledges that RPD does not produce an optimal decision, but argues that optimal decisions are unattainable in time-limited and stressful circumstances.¹⁷²

Klein’s initial investigation of RPD involved studying the way fire commanders made decisions during firefighting operations.¹⁷³ Since then, the United States Army has explored adopting it as a decision-making model for field

¹⁶⁸ Gary A. Klein, “Naturalistic Decision Making,” *Human Factors* 3, June 2008, 456–460, doi: 10.1518/001872008X288385.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 457.

¹⁷⁰ Gary A. Klein, “Recognition-Primed Decision,” *Gary A. Klein Associates Inc.*, Fairborn, OH, 138, http://www.ise.ncsu.edu/nsf_itr/794B/papers/Klein_1989_AMMSR_RPDM.pdf.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 146.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 144.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 139.

commanders.¹⁷⁴ Lieutenant Colonel David A. Bushey and Major Michael J. Forsyth claim that the Global War on Terrorism has necessitated a change from the Army's slow, methodical seven-step Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).¹⁷⁵ They assert the MDMP relegates the creation of options to inexperienced military aides instead of directly involving veteran commanders in the decision-making process.¹⁷⁶ As an alternative to the MDMP, Bushey and Forsyth recommend the adoption of a four-step decision-making model based on RPD.¹⁷⁷

In another article on the substitution of RPD for MDMP in military applications, Dr. Karol G. Ross et al. addressed one argument against implementing RPD as a military decision-making model.¹⁷⁸ The rationale against adopting RPD was based on the reasoning that field commanders with little background or experience might not be able to intuitively arrive at the best course of action in an unfamiliar situation.¹⁷⁹ Arguing the point, Ross et al. countered that the same was true under the MDMP model.¹⁸⁰ They contended that having multiple solutions generated by inexperienced military aides using the MDMP model were no more productive than having one course of action produced through the RPD model.¹⁸¹ Moreover, Ross et al. pointed out that the RPD model is more flexible and responsive when course corrections are needed.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁴ David A. Bushey and Michael J. Forsyth, "The Recognition-Primed Decision Model: An Alternative to the MDMP for GWOT," *Field Artillery* (January–February 2006): 13, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/218357602?accountid=12702>.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ Karol G. Ross et al., "The Recognition-Primed Decision Model," *Military Review* (July–August 2004): 6, <http://www.au.af.mil/AU/awc/awcgate/milreview/ross.pdf>.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

United States Naval Air Warfare researchers Johnston, Driskell, and Salas found evidence to support the premise that RPD is an effective decision-making process in time limited, stressful circumstances.¹⁸³ Johnston, Driskell, and Salas studied subjects who utilized either a “hypervigilant” (more instinctive) or a “vigilant” (more analytical) decision-making style in unpredictable, time-restricted situations.¹⁸⁴ Their research supported their hypothesis that “a hypervigilant decision-making strategy was more effective than a vigilant strategy on a naturalistic task under both normal- and high-stress conditions.”¹⁸⁵

Klein’s work on RPD has not only been applied to military operations, but has also been incorporated in National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) research on artificial intelligence.¹⁸⁶ NASA researcher William Gevarter used RPD as a framework to study how computers and humans could symbiotically interact during space exploration.¹⁸⁷ He believed RPD most accurately depicted the process in which humans make decisions, especially during stressful situations.¹⁸⁸ Based on that belief, he used it as his model for studying the possibilities of maximizing human and computer interactions.¹⁸⁹

John R. Patton, Associate Professor of Management at Florida Institute of Technology concluded that training enhances spontaneous actions.¹⁹⁰ Patton wrote that repetitive training produces reactions that become automatic, and

¹⁸³ Joan H. Johnston, James E. Driskell, and Eduardo Salas, “Vigilant and Hypervigilant Decision Making,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 4 (1997): 620, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.335.3659&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 614.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 620.

¹⁸⁶ William B. Gevarter, “MoCog1: A Computer Simulation of Recognition-Primed Human Decision Making,” *NASA Ames Research Center: Technical Report FIA-91-23* (August 1991), <http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19920017645.pdf>.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ John R. Patton, “Intuition in Decisions,” *Management Decision* (2003): 989, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/00251740310509517>.

appear to be intuitive.¹⁹¹ He contends that prior experiences, which individuals can draw upon when making decisions, could be based on actual occurrences or simulated scenarios obtained through training.¹⁹² This conclusion points to the importance of scenario-based training in acquiring an experience base to rely on when making decisions during future incidents.

Klein believed that RPD should not be taught per se, rather it provides understanding to how decisions are made.¹⁹³ He asserted that training is critical in helping individuals recognize patterns so that proper decisions can be made.¹⁹⁴ He stressed, “The part of intuition that involves pattern matching and recognition of familiar and typical cases can be trained. If you want people to size up situations quickly and accurately, you need to expand their experience base.”¹⁹⁵

The National Fire Academy and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command have modified their training regimens to include pattern recognition drills to develop rapid decision-making skills.¹⁹⁶ Police agencies should do the same. The content and focus of training is vitally important. When faced with sudden and unexpected choices, individuals tend to depend on those competencies that are most familiar. Based on the RPD model, it is logical to conclude that police officers will respond to stimuli in accordance with their training. If a majority of the officer’s training was focused on tactics of force, the officer will naturally gravitate to force as the solution. Police training should emphasize scenario-based training that provides officers with expanded

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid., 992.

¹⁹³ Gary A. Klein, Recognition-Primed Decision,” Gary A. Klein Associates Inc., Fairborn, OH, 146, http://www.ise.ncsu.edu/nsf_itr/794B/papers/Klein_1989_AMMSR_RPDM.pdf.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Gary Klein, *Sources of Power—How People Make Decisions* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press 1999), 42.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 44.

experiences and pattern recognition in de-escalation to draw upon when urgent decisions are needed in real-world situations.

F. HUMAN BEHAVIOR THEORIES THAT COULD IMPEDE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DE-ESCALATION PROGRAMS

In some exceptional instances, police agencies have made progress toward alternative approaches to policing that are less harmful to the public.¹⁹⁷ However, other police practitioners are opposed to changing their policies, procedures, or tactics.¹⁹⁸ Law enforcement's resistance to change can be analyzed through different theories of human behavior. One such model is the Selectorate Theory.¹⁹⁹

New York University professors Dr. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Dr. Alastair Smith crafted the Selectorate Theory, which posits that after achieving power, a leader's only focus is on retaining power.²⁰⁰ Bueno de Mesquita and Smith opine that leaders rely on two groups of devotees to acquire and maintain power, the "essentials" and the "influentials."²⁰¹ This coalition of supporters receives tangible rewards from the leader in order for him to remain in power.²⁰² Bueno de Mesquita and Smith theorize that the masses or the "nominal selectorate" are of little concern to the leader since they neither brought him into power nor have much impact on whether he stays in power.²⁰³

¹⁹⁷ Robert Rogers and David DeBolt, "Use of Deadly Force by Police Disappears on Richmond Streets," *Contra Costa Times*, September 6, 2014, http://www.contracostatimes.com/news/ci_26482775/use-deadly-force-by-police-disappears-richmond-streets.

¹⁹⁸ Timothy Williams, "Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-escalate," *New York Times*, June 27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-taught-to-use-force-police-warily-learn-to-de-escalate.html?_r=0.

¹⁹⁹ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics* (New York, New York: Public Affairs, 2011), Kindle edition, 283.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, location 355.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 11, 12.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 18.

Looking at law enforcement through the lens of Selectorate Theory would identify the police chief as the leader. Staff members, union members, and police officers would make up the ranks of the leader's inner circles of supporters, and the public would be the nominal selectorate. If the leader's inner circles of supporters oppose change, the leader will be less likely to implement change since they are keeping him in power. Thus, if the police officers believed de-escalation techniques are either less effective, or ineffective and could result in a greater chance of the police officers being physically harmed, they would oppose implementing de-escalation training.

The "status quo bias" is another theory of human behavior that could be used to analyze law enforcement's resistance to adopting de-escalation techniques. According to scholars Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, the status quo bias suggests that people tend to stay with what they are familiar with rather than change, even when changing could improve their situation.²⁰⁴ Police officers might be opposed to learning or using de-escalation techniques because they want to stay with what they know and are accustomed to. They might not perceive any need to change. In addition to the status quo bias, individuals might resist altering their behavior if their current actions are perceived as the norm or the preferred method of behavior.²⁰⁵ Thaler and Sunstein contend that groups will continue with a certain strategy or "tradition." even if the tradition is based on the view of a single person.²⁰⁶

A law enforcement example of a belief based on the opinion of one person is the commonly held safety standard of the 21-foot rule. The 21-foot rule was the result of a single study by a police officer in Salt Lake City, Utah in 1983.²⁰⁷ The

²⁰⁴ Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness* (Penguin Publishing Group, February 24, 2009), Kindle edition, 7–8.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 85.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 58–59.

²⁰⁷ Jaeah Lee, "The Controversial 'Rule' Police Rely on to Shoot and Kill Suspects [sic]," *Mother Jones*, December 14, 2015, <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/12/police-shootings-laquan-mcdonald-mario-woods-knives-21-foot-rule>.

officer calculated that an assailant with a knife could cover 21 feet in the amount of time it took for a police officer to remove his firearm from his holster, obtain target acquisition, and fire.²⁰⁸ The study was never duplicated nor verified, but it has become one of the canons of safety for police in the United States.²⁰⁹ It is believed by some people to have been misapplied and misinterpreted by some officers to justify shooting subjects armed with knives.²¹⁰

One method to motivate police agencies and their officers to adopt de-escalation strategies could be to offer rewards such as money. Giving money to police agencies in the form of grants has been one of the most effective ways substantial changes have been made in the past. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice implemented nationwide community oriented policing programs through grants.²¹¹ Offering grants in the form of overtime wages to police officers who participate in de-escalation training could cause a shift towards de-escalation. Moreover, monetary incentives could be given to police agencies that reduce use of force incidents, similar to how insurance companies offer discounts to members who participate in preventative measures.

Besides rewarding police officers and their agencies for compliance with established standards, punitive measures could be levied on police agencies to hold them accountable for noncompliance. Lawsuits have been one punitive method that has effected change in police procedures in the past and will most likely do so in the future. For lawsuits to effect lasting and universal change, case law needs to be established by decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court. While this method is powerful, it often takes several years for cases to wind through the appellate process. For example, the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of *Tennessee v. Garner* took over 10 years to make its way

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ "COPS Grants & Funding," U.S. Department of Justice: Community Oriented Policing Services, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/grants>.

through the judicial process before a decision was rendered.²¹² This momentous ruling struck down the policies and statutes that allowed for the shooting of unarmed, fleeing felons.²¹³

Another agent for change is to make technology and information easily accessible.²¹⁴ Requiring police agencies to submit statistical data on use of force incidents and then publishing that data to the masses could lead to greater awareness and accountability. As Louis Brandeis, a former Justice on the Supreme Court wrote, “Sunlight is the best of disinfectants.”²¹⁵ Shedding light on the policies and actions of the police might help facilitate change. Moreover, changes can be made through setting desired outcomes, informing others of results, and making individuals accountable for their performance.²¹⁶

Compelling police agencies to submit data to the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ Uniform Crime Report (UCR) is one way more accountability could be realized. Currently, the UCR lacks validity because the data provided by police agencies is voluntarily submitted.²¹⁷ This results in the UCR not being a true representation of policing in the United States. Police agencies should be mandated either through federal or local laws to provide an accurate accounting of their activities to the UCR.

²¹² James J. Fyfe and Jeffery T. Walker, “Garner Plus Five Years: An Examination of Supreme Court Intervention into Police Discretion and Legislative Prerogatives,” *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 14 (March 1, 1990): 167–171, <http://web.a.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&sid=6fbcd52-6571-4286-8b0a-81532ea33fad%40sessionmgr4001&hid=4112>.

²¹³ Ibid., 167.

²¹⁴ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, *The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics* (New York, New York: Public Affairs, 2011), Kindle edition, 273.

²¹⁵ Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness* (Penguin Publishing Group, February 24, 2009), Kindle edition, 243.

²¹⁶ Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Leadership BS: Fixing Workplaces and Careers One Truth at a Time* (HarperCollins Publishers, September 15, 2015), Kindle edition, 52–53.

²¹⁷ “Uniform Crime Reports,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr>.

One of the most powerful ways to effect change is through peer influence.²¹⁸ The profound influence of social pressure was well documented in a series of experiments performed in the 1950s by Solomon E. Asch, a professor of psychology at Swarthmore College.²¹⁹ Asch found that subjects confronted by peer pressure would agree with incorrect answers over 36% of the time during simple comparison exercises.²²⁰ As in any other group, peer pressure can encourage police officers to conform to the norms of the group. The difficulty might be getting the group to establish desirable norms. Creating positive perceptions of preferred norms could be accomplished through disseminating information about agencies that have achieved success through implementing de-escalation strategies. The Richmond Police Department is one such agency that could be highlighted for its impressive reduction in the use of force by its police officers.²²¹

As has been demonstrated by the different theories of human behavior, change is challenging to achieve. Implementing substantive changes in the way police officers use force is critical in maintaining harmony between law enforcement and the public. More importantly, it is critical in preserving the safety of the police and of their fellow citizens.

²¹⁸ Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness* (Penguin Publishing Group, February 24, 2009), Kindle edition, 54.

²¹⁹ Solomon E. Asch, "Opinions and Social Pressure," *Scientific American* (November 1955): 1–8, <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/terrace/w1001/readings/asch.pdf>.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 3–4.

²²¹ Robert Rogers and David DeBolt, "Use of Deadly Force by Police Disappears on Richmond Streets," *East Bay Times News*, September 6, 2014, http://www.eastbaytimes.com/news/ci_26482775/use-deadly-force-by-police-disappears-richmond-streets.

III. APPLYING POSITIONING THEORY TO THE WARRIOR VERSUS GUARDIAN DEBATE

Beginning in 2014, a national conversation erupted over the appropriateness of the force being used by police officers.²²² Part of the discussion revolved around the use of two words describing the police, warriors and guardians.²²³ The topic of which label to apply to law enforcement was even included in two of the six pillars of the Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing.²²⁴

One side of the warrior versus guardian dispute argues that officers face countless dangers to protect society.²²⁵ To protect themselves, they must have a warrior mindset and be cautious, careful, and wary.²²⁶ They enter battle everyday against those who would do harm to them and others.²²⁷ To survive, they must think like warriors.²²⁸

The other side of the deliberation contends that police officers are not engaging in battle.²²⁹ Rather, they are serving fellow citizens.²³⁰ Moreover, these individuals believe that the warrior archetype builds barriers between the police

²²² "Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force," Police Executive Research Forum, August 2015, 9, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf>.

²²³ Dave Smith, "Warriors or Guardians?" *Police—The Law Enforcement Magazine*, January 13, 2016, <http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2016/01/warriors-or-guardians.aspx>.

²²⁴ "The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing," Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 2015, 9 and 19, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.

²²⁵ Seth Stoughton, "Police Warriors or Community Guardians?" *Washington Monthly*, April 17, 2015, <http://washingtonmonthly.com/2015/04/17/police-warriors-or-community-guardians/>.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Sue Rahr and Stephen K. Rice, "From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American Police Culture to Democratic Ideals," *National Institute of Justice*, April 2015, 2, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248654.pdf>.

²³⁰ Ibid., 2.

and the public that thwart community policing efforts.²³¹ Less interaction with the public hampers public safety and crime-solving efforts due to fewer clues, leads, and information being supplied by citizens.²³² While some may view the warrior versus guardian dispute as mere semantics that have little or no effect on behavior, this chapter will explore the impact words have on human interactions. The Positioning Theory (PT) framework will be used to analyze the warrior versus guardian debate.

A. THE WARRIOR PERSONA

It may be challenging to pinpoint how or when the warrior persona began to be venerated among law enforcement practitioners. However, a possible point of genesis is a book first released in 2004 authored by retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman and his co-author Lorin W. Christensen entitled *On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace*.²³³ Grossman and Christensen frame the premise for their book in the introduction section.²³⁴

There are only two kinds of people once the bullets start to fly: warriors and victims, those who fight and those who are unprepared, unable or unwilling to defend themselves. Since you chose to pick up this book, I assume that you walk the warrior's path.

Today the peacekeepers and the peace officers are moving toward each other. Around the world, warriors in blue (police and other peace officers) and warriors in green (soldiers, marines and other peacekeepers) find themselves facing the same kind of missions.²³⁵

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ "Books by Dave Grossman," Killology Research Group, A Warrior Science Group Partner, <http://www.killology.com/books.htm>.

²³⁴ Dave Grossman and Loren W. Christensen, *On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace* (Human Factor Research Group, Inc. Publications, 2012), Kindle edition, 188–192.

²³⁵ Ibid.

Throughout the book, Grossman and Christensen extol the virtues of the warrior, with police officers included in that category.²³⁶ The ethos of the warrior conjures images of heroic figures who are brave, skilled, and resolute. It builds pride and esteem, and sets one apart from the masses. Whether Grossman and Christensen's book was the flash point of applying the label, the fact remains that many police officers have enthusiastically embraced the distinction of being called a warrior.²³⁷

A story in one section of their book has been particularly inculcated into police lore.²³⁸ The story is the fable of the sheep, the sheepdog, and the wolf.²³⁹ In the fable, attributed to an unnamed Vietnam War era colonel, citizens are identified as "sheep."²⁴⁰ He explains that sheep have no proclivity to commit violence but are victims of violent acts perpetrated by "wolves" who commit evil deeds.²⁴¹ The sheep's only protectors are the "sheepdogs."²⁴² Law enforcement and military personnel are specifically identified as the warriors or "sheepdogs" that protect the "sheep."²⁴³ The fable concludes with the following pronouncement.

If you have no capacity for violence then you are a healthy productive citizen: a sheep. If you have a capacity for violence and no empathy for your fellow citizens, then you have defined an aggressive sociopath— a wolf. But what if you have a capacity for violence, and a deep love for your fellow citizens? Then you are a sheepdog, a warrior, someone who is walking the hero's path.

²³⁶ Ibid., 64.

²³⁷ "Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force," Police Executive Research Forum, August 2015, 28–38, accessed <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf>.

²³⁸ "Book Excerpt: On Sheep, Wolves, and Sheepdogs" PoliceOne.com, July 3, 2008, <https://www.policeone.com/police-heroes/articles/1709289-Book-Excerpt-On-Sheep-Wolves-and-Sheepdogs/>.

²³⁹ Dave Grossman and Loren W. Christensen, *On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace* (Human Factor Research Group, Inc. Publications, 2012), Kindle edition, 4194–4291.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

Someone who can walk into the heart of darkness, into the universal human phobia, and walk out unscathed.²⁴⁴

After relaying the fable, Grossman and Christensen expound on the analogy, pointing out the similarities of the sheepdog and the wolf, their fangs and their penchant for violence.²⁴⁵ However, Grossman and Christensen emphatically stress that unlike the wolf, the sheepdog must never harm the sheep.²⁴⁶

While their tale may be entertaining and instill esprit de corps in police officers that read or hear it, the famed fable is flawed in its analogy. In nature, wolves and sheep are easily distinguishable. They belong to entirely different species. Conversely, in human society, people are of the same species. There is no way to visually discern between good people or evil people. They both look like “sheep” to use Grossman and Christensen’s analogy. Following this reasoning, police officers might perceive all “sheep” to be possible “wolves” and interact with them accordingly.

Whether Grossman and Christensen initiated the warrior mythos is unknown. Nevertheless, amalgamating police and military is contrary to the Posse Comitatus Act that was passed by the United States Congress in 1878.²⁴⁷ The Posse Comitatus Act specifically prohibits the use of the military for domestic law enforcement purposes.²⁴⁸ Since that time, the police and the military have had separate and divergent missions. Blurring the line of demarcation may have had some subconscious sway on the police during the demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri, in August of 2014.²⁴⁹ At the Ferguson protests,

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 4236.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Charles Doyle and Jennifer K. Elsea, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law,” *Congressional Research Service* (August 16, 2012): summary, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf>.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 1.

²⁴⁹ Paul Szoldra, “This is the Terrifying Result of the Militarization of Police,” *Business Insider: Military & Defense*, August 12, 2014, <http://www.businessinsider.com/police-militarization-ferguson-2014-8>.

demonstrators were confronted by police officers using military style weapons, vehicles, and apparel.²⁵⁰

Undoubtedly there were other motivating factors in the police response in Ferguson and to the alleged militarization of American law enforcement. For instance, an overemphasis on officer safety and survival pervades law enforcement training regimens.²⁵¹ Police officers are taught to consider any situation as possibly harmful.²⁵² Police psychologist, Dr. Kevin Gilmartin, has labeled this heightened awareness “hypervigilance.”²⁵³ In this hyper-vigilant state, police officers may perceive seemingly innocuous behavior as potentially life threatening.²⁵⁴ While adaptability and resiliency are desired traits for officers, in actuality, very few citizens are intent on harming the police.²⁵⁵ According to the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, officers have less than a 2% chance of being assaulted.²⁵⁶

One possible reason for police officers fearing that they may be harmed is explained through the Availability Heuristic. The Availability Heuristic asserts that individuals will assess the probability of an event occurring based on examples they can easily recall.²⁵⁷ If instances of officers suffering harm during routine tasks are prominent in the minds of the police, they may fixate on that possibility, act apprehensive of others, and be quick to take action. Taking quick action is undisputedly important in some situations. However, misperceiving behaviors of

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Seth Stoughton, “Law Enforcement’s ‘Warrior’ Problem,” *Harvard Law Review Forum*, April 10, 2015, <http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/04/law-enforcements-warrior-problem/>.

²⁵² Kevin M. Gilmartin, *Emotional Survival For Law Enforcement* (Tucson, Arizona: E-S Press, April 2002), 34.

²⁵³ Ibid., 35.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 34.

²⁵⁵ “Law Enforcement Facts,” National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, accessed June 29, 2016, <http://www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement/>.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness* (Penguin Publishing Group, February 24, 2009), Kindle edition, 25.

others due to an unrealistic perspective may lead to inappropriate or misapplied force.

Police training courses contain ample examples, including video recordings, of police officers being harmed and killed during traffic stops and other routine tasks.²⁵⁸ While it is critical for officers to understand the dangers of their job and train to counteract them, fixating on the dangers could result in the misuse of force. Police training curriculum needs to point out the hazards of the job, but it also needs to emphasize the remote chances of them occurring.

Although the probabilities of being injured in the line of duty are low, according to Gilmartin, law enforcement officers lean towards being suspicious of others.²⁵⁹ Additionally, officers tend to see individuals and situations disparagingly.²⁶⁰ They frequently interact with individuals who have committed crimes or have acted unwisely, which leads to cynicism and sometimes pejorative labeling of those outside an officer's in-group.²⁶¹

B. POSITIONING THEORY AND THE WARRIOR VERSUS GUARDIAN DEBATE

Slocum-Bradley's principles mentioned in Chapter II could be used to analyze and perhaps resolve the warrior versus guardian debate. For example, her second peace promoting point recommends, "identifying people as members of the same group."²⁶² As was shown in the town versus gown incident, people who identify themselves as belonging to the same group tend to perceive that they have equal rights and duties.²⁶³ Applying the same label to everyone in a

²⁵⁸ Seth Stoughton, "Law Enforcement's 'Warrior' Problem," *Harvard Law Review Forum*, April 10, 2015, <http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/04/law-enforcements-warrior-problem/>.

²⁵⁹ Kevin M. Gilmartin, *Emotional Survival For Law Enforcement* (Tucson, Arizona: E-S Press, April 2002), 33.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

²⁶² Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 9.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

situation helps remove tension and barriers in the form of in-group versus out-group dynamics.

The argument for not using special labels for police officers is also supported by a set of values taught to 19th Century police officers. In 1829, Sir Robert Peel helped established the Metropolitan Police in London, England.²⁶⁴ When it was formed, every Metropolitan police recruit was given a list of principles referred to as *Robert Peel's Nine Principles of Policing*. Although it bears his name, historians believe the attribution is apocryphal.²⁶⁵ Nevertheless, principle number seven reads,

To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that *the police are the public and that the public are the police*, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence [emphasis added].²⁶⁶

In light of Peel and Slocum-Bradley's principles, perhaps it is imprudent to apply any superordinate labels to the police. Officers need to remember that while they may have received specialized training in law enforcement, all citizens have the duty to participate in efforts to maintain a safe and lawful society. In some states, such as Idaho, citizens have rights equal to the police to enforce statutes through citizens' arrest authority.²⁶⁷

Law enforcement officers are an integral part of the community and are dependent on their fellow community members for assistance in maintaining order and safety. As with any job, police work does have inherent risks. However, those risks should not overshadow or dominate the true purpose for the

²⁶⁴ "Sir Robert Peel and the New Metropolitan Police," The Learning Curve Crime and Punishment, <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/candp/prevention/g08/g08cs2.htm>.

²⁶⁵ "Definition of Policing by Consent," Gov.UK, December 10, 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent/definition-of-policing-by-consent>.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ "Idaho Statutes," State of Idaho Legislature, accessed June 29, 2016, <http://legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title19/T19CH6SECT19-604.htm>.

existence of law enforcement, that of working with and serving their fellow citizens.

IV. ANALYSIS OF FORCE AND DE-ESCALATION TRAINING

The foundation for a police officer's career is built during initial training in the police academy. Thus, the content of the core curriculum delivered to new recruits is of paramount importance. However, there are no national training standards that all officers are required to meet in the United States. Each individual state sets their own training standards and minimum qualifications for law enforcement officers and police academies.

The critical nature of police training requires thorough and constant oversight of the curriculum, which is typically accomplished by an executive and a governing board in each state. Each governing board establishes a minimum number of training hours for each core topic, and each police agency is required to adhere to the standards. The executive who is responsible for police standards and training in each state belongs to the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training or IADLEST. Some United States territories, military police, and federal law enforcement are also represented in the IADLEST.²⁶⁸

As part of this thesis, a survey was conducted among members of the IADLEST. Instructions for the survey directed the executive in each state to complete the survey or delegate it to a person on the training staff who had the most knowledge of their training requirements. The survey was conducted to determine the minimum number of training hours assigned to force and de-escalation topics. The results of the survey given to IADLEST members will be compared to a similar survey that was conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model of decision-making will be applied to the results of both surveys as part of the analysis and discussion.

²⁶⁸ "IADLEST State Member Directory," accessed September 2, 2016, <http://www.iadlest.org/About/StateMemberDirectory.aspx>.

A. POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM SURVEY

Police officers wield broad authority as they perform their duties. They are bestowed with the right to temporarily deny citizens' freedoms, and ultimately hold the legal justification to use lethal force in defense of their life or the life of another. Consequently, training standards are of the utmost importance and must be carefully crafted and approved by governing public officials. The responsibility of ensuring adherence to the training standards is entrusted to the training and standards executive and council in each state.

During training, a new police officer accumulates and refines skills, knowledge, and perceptions of the profession. While new capabilities are learned through the initial educational process, a novice officer's intrinsic abilities and attitudes are enhanced or attenuated through training. Some law enforcement techniques that require fine motor skills must be relearned and refreshed throughout a police officer's career. These perishable skills are learned in basic training and then reviewed during in-service training sessions that focus on maintaining techniques that are critical to the officers' safety and the safety of those they serve.

A portion of basic and continuing education training for officers is dedicated to the use of force. The word "force" when used in a law enforcement context is a broad term that includes weaponry such as firearms, aerosol irritants, blunt impact weapons, and electronic control devices sometimes referred to as Tasers.²⁶⁹ It also encompasses empty hand defensive and offensive techniques such as blocks, strikes, kicks, joint manipulation, and pressure point control tactics.


In an attempt to determine the status of police training in the United States, the PERF conducted a survey in 2015 of 280 police agencies.²⁷⁰ The

²⁶⁹ Taser is a brand name for a particular make of electronic control device.

²⁷⁰ "Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force," Police Executive Research Forum, August 2015, 11, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf>.

survey collected the number of training hours devoted to different topics.²⁷¹ The results of the survey show a high number of training hours dedicated to topics associated with the use of force, while few training hours are assigned to learning skills to avoid using force.²⁷² The results of the PERF survey shown in Figure 7, displays 129 hours as the median number of hours given to each cadet to learn about firearms, defensive tactics, and other topics of force.²⁷³ By contrast, the median number of hours spent studying solely de-escalation topics was 16.²⁷⁴

Recruit Training: Hours Spent on Use-of-Force Topics (median values)



Source: Police Executive Research Forum

“Con Law” is interpreted as Constitutional Law. “UoF” is understood as Use of Force. “ECW” is translated as Electronic Control Weapon commonly referred to as “Taser.” “OC Spray” is read as Oleoresin Capsicum Spray.

Figure 7. PERF Survey Results of Recruit Training Hours.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Source: Ibid.

It is understandable that police executives would spend a considerable amount of time dedicated to training on high-risk activities such as force. However, this significant imbalance might subconsciously lead law enforcement officers to unduly rely on those skills when dealing with the public, particularly in stressful situations. The RPD model of decision-making—which states that individuals facing time-limited, volatile situations rely on prior experiences to arrive at a decision—supports this supposition.²⁷⁶

B. SURVEY METHODOLOGY

A survey was distributed to the members of IADLEST in order to ascertain if any changes had occurred to the general training curriculum since the PERF survey was conducted. The IADLEST survey included 12 questions. The first eight questions requested information on the required minimum number of training hours taught on specified topics such as firearms and de-escalation. These questions were based on the PERF survey's queries.

The next four questions probed other aspects of police recruit training not addressed in the PERF survey. Question nine asked for the required minimum number of training hours dedicated to scenario-based training. In Questions 10, 11, and 12, the respondents were asked to provide a percentage of the number of times scenarios required either firearms or other force tactics, or de-escalation techniques to correctly complete the scenario. A copy of the survey questions is provided in Appendix A.

The IADLEST survey was completed and submitted anonymously using online software from Survey Monkey Incorporated. A representative of IADLEST tracked which members responded so as to ensure there were no duplicate surveys. However, that information was not forwarded to this author, and all tracking functions within the Survey Monkey Incorporated software were disabled to ensure the anonymity of those who completed the survey.

²⁷⁶ Gary A. Klein, "Naturalistic Decision Making," *Human Factors* 3, June 2008, 457, doi: 10.1518/001872008X288385.

C. SURVEY RESULTS

Surveys were delivered to the members of IADLEST and 15 were returned completed. However, some participants did not provide a numerical response to some questions, which limited the data that was available to tabulate results. The unedited responses of the 15 surveys that were returned are displayed in Appendix B. Appendix C contains computation tables of the data, including the median numbers, average numbers, and percentages of training hours provided to recruits.

Scenario-based training hours reported on the IADLEST survey varied considerably from zero to 800, with an average of 102 hours and a median of 42 hours. The percentage of training scenarios that required the discharge of a firearm to correctly resolve the scenario ranged from 2.5% to 10% with an average of 8% and a median percentage of 10%. The scenario-based training question vis-à-vis the use of weapons other than a firearm had percentages ranging from 5% to 90%, with an average of 25% and a median of 20%. For scenarios requiring the use of de-escalation only, the percentages ranged from 5% to 95% with an average of 51% and a median of 65%. Refer to Appendix C for a comprehensive review of all the data. The results of the IADLEST survey are graphically depicted in Figure 8. Questions about Con Law/Legal Issues, Basic First-Aid, and Communication Skills posed in the PERF survey were not asked in the IADLEST survey.




Figure 8. IADLEST Survey Results.

D. DISCUSSION

The debate over the use of force by police officers has been ongoing for many years. However, its prominence in the public discourse has elevated since 2014, and it appears to be at or nearing a crescendo. As an example, PERF released a publication in January of 2016 entitled *Use of Force: Taking Policing to a Higher Standard*.²⁷⁷ The publication outlined “30 Guiding Principles” to reduce the incidents of force by police officers in the United States.²⁷⁸ Since PERF’s 30 principles were published, they have received criticism from various law enforcement groups such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).²⁷⁹ Even the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Associates (FBINAA) has asked their national and international members for feedback and input before formulating a response to PERF’s publication.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ “Use of Force: Taking Policing to a Higher Standard,” Police Executive Research Forum, January 29, 2016, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf>.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ David C. Couper, “I Will Support the PERF Report,” *Improving Police: A Veteran Police Chief Discusses Effective Ways to Lead, Improve, and Restore Trust*, February 3, 2016, <https://improvingpolice.wordpress.com/2016/02/03/i-will-support-the-perf-report/>.


²⁸⁰ FBI National Academy Associates, Inc., email message to author, April 13, 2016.

Conducting such a query of its membership is unprecedented in recent FBINAA history.

Along with the IACP, the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) denounced PERF's attempt to establish a new standard for defining appropriate use of force that exceeds the one set by the United States Supreme Court. ALADS argued that the PERF's principles could place a police officer in the position of obeying the law of the land yet acting contrary to standards arbitrarily set by agencies. ALADS also took exception to the PERF principle that suggests a police officer reflects on how the public might view a use of force, prior to using force. Attempting to ascertain ephemeral public opinion places the officer in a near impossible position, especially during highly volatile and rapidly evolving situations.²⁸¹

The survey on force and de-escalation was given to the IADLEST members during this period when the discourse on the topic was elevated and emotionally charged. The low return of surveys may have been due in part to the debate in law enforcement circles over force versus de-escalation. Nevertheless, with one exception, the results of the IADLEST survey and the PERF survey yielded similar results. The PERF survey and the IADLEST survey are aggregated in Figure 9 for ease of comparison.

²⁸¹ Sean Van Leeuwen, "Police Reform—Ideas That Lack Merit," *Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs Blog* 2016, <http://myemail.constantcontact.com/Police-reform---ideas-that-lack-merit.html?soid=1119707513166&aid=zrAFJ8QNkbg>.



PERF data obtained from PERF report.²⁸²

Figure 9. Aggregation of PERF and IADLEST Surveys.

The one significant difference between the PERF survey and the IADLEST survey was found in the category of scenario-based training hours. As shown in Figure 9, training hours are fairly consistent between the two surveys with the exception of scenario-based training hours. The difference in this category could have resulted from the format of the question. The PERF question was labeled “use of force based scenario training.” while the survey of the IADLEST membership requested hours for all scenario-based training. The objective of the question in the IADLEST survey was to capture all scenario-based training hours, even those using only de-escalation techniques. However, it is possible that other scenario-based training that did not include elements of handling conflict could have been included in the total numbers of hours in the IADLEST responses. Examples of scenario-based training that does not include

²⁸² Adapted from “Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force,” Police Executive Research Forum, August 2015, 11, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf>.

resolving conflict are motor vehicle accident scene investigation or administering field sobriety tests for detecting impaired driving.

An initial hypothesis of this research, which aligned with RPD, posited that an overemphasis on firearms and force in police training might predispose officers to use force or firearms in volatile situations. The results of the IADLEST survey calculate to an 8.9 to 1 ratio of training hours dedicated to force topics versus training hours devoted to de-escalation topics. While it is clear that force topics consume a significant percentage of training hours, the IADLEST survey results point to a de-emphasis of force and firearms during scenario-based training. The median percentage of scenarios that mandated firearms or force to successfully complete them was 10% and 20% respectively. On the other hand, a median percentage of 65% of all training scenarios were appropriately resolved using de-escalation techniques only. Even though non-conflict related scenarios could have been included in the results of the training scenarios that required only de-escalation to resolve, the results suggest that a majority of scenarios train police officers to use de-escalation.

Both surveys suggest that training hours are much higher for firearms and force than for de-escalation. However, during scenario-based training, de-escalation is emphasized. Interpreting these findings within the framework of RPD would support the theory that police recruits are provided experiences in successful use of de-escalation to draw upon when confronted with actual, real-world volatile encounters. While this finding is promising, it must be remembered that it is based on limited number of responses.

The IADLEST survey results on scenario-based training may be favorable to de-escalation, however, the required use of firearms in training scenarios still appears to be overrepresented when compared to real-world experiences. For instance, the New York Police Department published statistics in 2011 on the number of times one of their police officers discharged a firearm “during [an]

adversarial conflict.”²⁸³ The New York report documented that 62 officers had fired their weapons when confronted with a volatile situation.²⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the number of police interactions with citizens was estimated at 23 million during the same time period.²⁸⁵ From these data, it can be calculated that an officer in New York would have a 0.0003% probability of needing to discharge a firearm while interacting with citizens during the course of a year. When compared to the low probability of discharging a firearm, the IADLEST survey’s result of a 10% rate of using a firearm in training scenarios points to an overrepresentation of firearms in the training curriculum. Applying the results of the IADLEST survey to the RPD framework leads to a conclusion that new police officers are predisposed by their training experiences to use firearms at a higher rate than is needed in real-world situations.

²⁸³ Raymond W. Kelly, “2011 Annual firearms Discharge Report,” *New York City Police Department* (August 2012): xiii, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/nypd_annual_firearms_discharge_report_2011.pdf.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

The discussion on Positioning Theory (PT) supported the supposition that its principles could be leveraged for peaceful resolutions in encounters between the police and the public. Slocum-Bradley's lists of discursive acts that promote peace provide strategies that could be employed to aid de-escalation.²⁸⁶ Based on the principles she formulated, the first recommendation is that no superordinate labels, such as warrior or guardian, be applied to police officers. Labels create in-group versus out-group acts and attitudes, which can be divisive. Rather, it is proposed that an emphasis is place on the position that law enforcement officers are part of the community with the recognition that all members of society have rights and duties for the care and welfare of the community members.

Additionally, it is recommended that the citizenry, which includes the police, be periodically reminded that the overwhelming majority of citizens are law-abiding members of society. It should be remembered that most people have nonthreatening intentions.²⁸⁷ It is further suggested that officers be discouraged from engaging in speech acts that disparage, vilify, and denounce others.²⁸⁸ They are counterproductive and do nothing to reduce crime or make communities safer.

Police officers need effective skills and techniques that can be utilized to restore peace in tumultuous situations. Research supporting the effectiveness of the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model at reducing the use of force is meager at best. However, CIT techniques have received national acceptance as effective

²⁸⁶ Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 8–9.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

methods for resolving conflicts with individuals suffering from mental illness.²⁸⁹ As was shown in Chapter IV, most police recruits are given some level of CIT training in the basic police academy. The PERF survey found that police recruits are provided with a median number of eight hours of crisis intervention training.²⁹⁰ The IADLEST survey data showed that six hours of crisis intervention training are given to new police officers. Neither the PERF survey nor the IADLEST survey detailed the content of the training courses. It is unknown whether the eight and six hours of crisis intervention training were occupied with lectures or role-playing exercises. The Memphis model of CIT calls for 9.5 hours of scenario-based training on de-escalation skills.²⁹¹ One study on CIT recommended an emphasis on scenario-based training to practice and assimilate de-escalation techniques.²⁹² However, this study suggested that de-escalation skills diminish over time.²⁹³ Based on a review of the current research, it is recommended that CIT training delivered to police recruits be comprised mostly of role-playing exercises, and for that training to be repeated periodically throughout a police officer's career. The training curricula should emphasize role-playing opportunities that provide diverse options, highlighting de-escalation, to successfully complete the scenario.

The suggestion of emphasizing scenario-based training is aligned with the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model discussed in Chapters II and IV. Additionally, it coincides with the successful training program implemented by the Richmond (California) Police Department. In addition to recommending an

²⁸⁹ Michael T. Compton et al., "A Comprehensive Review of Extant Research on Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Programs," *The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law* 1 (November 2008): 47, <http://www.jaapl.org/content/36/1/47.full.pdf+html>.

²⁹⁰ "Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force," Police Executive Research Forum, August 2015, 11, <http://www.policeforum.org/assets/reengineeringtraining1.pdf>.

²⁹¹ "National Curriculum," University of Memphis CIT Center: A Resource for CIT Programs Across the Nation, accessed July 10, 2016, <http://cit.memphis.edu/curriculum.php?id=0>.

²⁹² Megan L. Davidson, "A Criminal Justice System-Wide Response to Mental Illness: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Memphis Crisis Intervention Team Training Curriculum Among Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers," *Criminal Justice Policy Review* (2016): 68, doi: 10.1177/0887403414554997.

²⁹³ Ibid.

emphasis on scenario-based training, it is proposed that Richmond's quarterly training curriculum be closely examined for possible replication in other police agencies.

Based on the findings of Chapter IV, it is suggested that additional training hours be dedicated to learning and applying de-escalation techniques. Parity should be achieved in the number of training hours assigned to force, and de-escalation. It is further recommended for scenario-based training to more accurately reflect real-world probabilities. In other words, there is a need for a reduction in training scenarios that require firearms to successfully complete the role-playing exercise, and an increase in scenarios that require de-escalation to correctly resolve the exercise.

It is also suggested that a national standardized definition of de-escalation be established in order to more accurately categorize and document training hours dedicated to the subject. In the IADLEST survey, 87% of the respondents were able to provide a specific number of hours of instruction time for firearms and force classes. Conversely, only 60% of the IADLEST survey participants responded with a precise number of training hours identified for de-escalation. It is possible that fewer respondents were able to articulate an exact number of training hours for de-escalation due to the lack of a universal definition for the term.

It is recommended that United States police agencies reject the adoption of the Police Executive Research Forum's Critical Decision-Making Model (CDMM). While it may be feasible to follow the principles of the CDMM in countries that have significantly fewer privately owned firearms, it would not be a safe framework to use in the United States. On the other hand, it is suggested that United States police agencies adopt strategies and tactics from other countries including the United Kingdom's strategy of tactically withdrawing in situations where it would be reasonable and safe for everyone involved to do so. Additionally, it is proposed that police agencies in the United States could benefit from adopting the 10 Operational Safety Principles of Project Beacon from

Victoria (Australia) Police. In doing so, agencies should not overlook the lesson learned by the Victorian police of the critical need for constant and persistent refresher and reinforcement training in the principles of Project Beacon.

It is further recommended that United States police administrators explore the possible benefits of utilizing the Tasmania (Australia) Police Job Suitability Test or some adaptation of it. Many United States police agencies already use personality tests like the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory during their hiring processes.²⁹⁴ It may not be difficult to modify this step of the hiring process in the United States if further study of the Tasmanian model proves to be beneficial at reducing the use of force.

To motivate police agencies and their officers to implement de-escalation strategies, it is recommended that monetary incentives be offered to them in the form of grants of overtime money for officers participating in de-escalation courses. Additionally, it is suggested that financial rewards be given to police agencies that reduce use of force incidents, similar to how insurance companies offer discounts to members who participate in preventative measures.

It is proposed that police agencies be required to submit statistical data to the Federal Bureau of Investigations' Uniform Crime Report and that the data be made easily accessible to the public. This should lead to greater awareness and accountability. It is further recommended that the practices and procedures of police agencies that have reduced the use of force in their jurisdiction be widely disseminated to all law enforcement agencies to provide positive peer pressure.

²⁹⁴ Gary L. Fischler, "Identifying Psychological Predictors of Police Officer Integrity Problems," U.S. DOJ CFDA No. 16.710 (December 19, 2004): 19, <http://www.psycheval.com/Identifying%20Psychological%20Predictors%20of%20Police%20Officer%20Integrity%20Problems%20-%20Final%20Draft.pdf>.

VI. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Several areas for future research were revealed during the compilation of data and information for this thesis. For example, a dearth of research supporting or disproving the effectiveness of Crisis Intervention Teams (CITs) at reducing the use of force was discovered. Future research should be undertaken to demonstrate the proficiency of CITs at reducing the use of force. Future research should be conducted of actual incidents, based on consistent standards, that compare CIT trained officers and officers without CIT training. This research should not be based on hypothetical scenarios and questionnaires about officers' perceptions and intentions. What people think they would do or hope they would do, many times is different than what they actually do.

It would also be educational and productive to research whether CIT trained officers use less force in all situations, not just those involving individuals suffering from mental illnesses. Research of this type could help establish a standardized de-escalation training regimen for all police officers. Other areas of possible research could be an in-depth study of the Tasmania (Australia) Police Job Suitability Test and the quarterly scenario-based training curriculum of the Richmond (California) Police Department. Both programs warrant closer examination for possible replication if research supports their reported achievements at reducing the use of force.

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VII. CONCLUSIONS

Police in the United States are at a crossroads. It is the perception of some members of society that law enforcement is not using techniques to ensure the safety of all individuals, and they have demanded changes in strategies and tactics that are less harmful.²⁹⁵ Police officials should adjust to satisfy these calls for change or risk weakening the authority granted to them by the citizenry. The United States was built upon the precepts of “safety and happiness” and formed a government to uphold these ideals.²⁹⁶ The Declaration of Independence affirms,

That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, -- That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.²⁹⁷

Undoubtedly, the overwhelming majority of police officers seek to provide peace and security for their citizens. Nevertheless, if strategies exist that could accomplish the safety and happiness of society while better safeguarding all citizens, it is incumbent on law enforcement to explore, adopt, and implement those strategies.

This thesis attempted to clarify the issues surrounding the perceived inappropriate use of force by police officers. It offered theories on decision-making and understanding on human interactions. It also provided recommendations on measures that could be undertaken to reduce the use of force in police and citizen encounters.

²⁹⁵ “A Unified Statement of Action to Promote Reform and Stop Police Abuse,” ACLU, August 18, 2014, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/black_leaders_joint_statement_-_final_-_8-18.pdf.

²⁹⁶ “The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription,” The Charters of Freedom, July 4, 1776, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

A. POSITIONING THEORY

Educating officers on the concepts of Positioning Theory (PT) could provide awareness of the significance of words and labels during interactions with others. Teaching them about PT could help strengthen de-escalation skills by instructing them in peace-promoting positions, speech acts, and storylines. Understanding and being aware of these maneuvers and subtleties can be leveraged to achieve peaceful conclusions to conflicts. Moreover, the principles of PT suggest worthwhile solutions to the warrior versus guardian kerfuffle and the cynicism that has the potential of permeating the perceptions police officers may have. For example, projecting equal rights and duties to all people promotes peace while allocating disparate rights and duties encourages conflict.²⁹⁸ Assigning superordinate labels to the police and allocating pejorative terms to the public sets up dissimilar groups with unequal rights and duties. And, as mentioned by Slocum-Bradley, marginalizing and denigrating others fuels conflict.²⁹⁹ Officers should be framed as common members of society, who along with all other community members, have the rights and duties to serve and protect.

B. CRISIS INTERVENTION TEAMS

While law enforcement practitioners, community leaders, and citizens are looking for answers to the perceived misapplied force problem in the United States, the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model has not been proven to be a viable answer. Intuitively it seems like it should be effective at reducing force. However, the research reviewed for this thesis did not compellingly support the premise that CIT de-escalation techniques decrease the use of force. Law enforcement agencies and CIT programs should analyze successful training regimens to assess techniques they can adopt to de-escalate tense situations involving officers and mental health patients.

²⁹⁸ Nikki Slocum-Bradley, *Promoting Conflict or Peace Through Identity* (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 8–9.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

C. DE-ESCALATION

Attempts by governments and communities to reduce police violence are undertaken worldwide, and methods, policies, and philosophies that aim to reduce the use of force are distinct from country to country. Violent criminals around the globe may have similar goals of harming the police. However, the availability, variety, and lethality of weapons limit their capability to do harm, which leads to divergent policies and procedures. Still, it is a worthwhile endeavor to explore how various foreign law enforcement agencies deal with the issue of safely policing their communities while doing as little harm to their citizens as possible. Reducing the level and occurrence of force used by law enforcement officers has become a contentious topic in the United States. Opinions are sharp and positions are entrenched. Empathetic listening by all involved is vital to strengthening relationships and arriving at solutions. Acting on proposed solutions should be made in a well thought out manner.

Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) provides insight to likely reasons why police officers have shot some unarmed individuals, and leads to a viable solution to counter that impulse. The literature on RPD suggested that in time-limited, stressful circumstances, individuals rely on past experiences to formulate contingencies to successfully resolve the given situation.³⁰⁰ Research supports the premise that police recruit training overemphasizes force and firearms. Police officers need to be given a diverse training experience, with a more equal balance of force and de-escalation options. It is believed that this will result in police interactions with citizens being resolved in a manner that is safer for both the officers and the citizens.

A comment by ALADS' Vice President Sean Van Leeuwen's denunciations of PERF's 30 Guiding Principles coincides with the premise of this

³⁰⁰ Gary A. Klein, "Naturalistic Decision Making," *Human Factors* 3, June 2008, 456–460, doi: 10.1518/001872008X288385.

research.³⁰¹ Van Leeuwen stated, “Uses of force don’t occur in a vacuum. They are usually fluid, rapidly evolving situations which require split-second decisions based on an individual officer’s training, experience and assessment of the situation unfolding in front of them.”³⁰² Van Leeuwen’s description is a succinct summary and affirmation of RPD. Familiarity with various techniques to appropriately resolve situations will help ensure the safety of the officers and the people they interact with.

Educating citizens on the values and objectives held by the police is important. However, listening to the public’s input is vital to strengthening relationships. Furthermore, listening and then acting on that input is critical in maintaining the trust and confidence the public has in the police. Citizens in a liberal democracy have the right and the responsibility to help craft the rules and regulations the police are to follow. Police officers are vital to the security of their communities. However, they are dependent on their fellow community members for assistance in maintaining order and safety. As with any job, police work does have inherent risks. Nevertheless, those risks should not overshadow or dominate the true purpose for the existence of the police, that of working with and serving their fellow citizens. When the police and the public work together, society can be made safer for everyone.

³⁰¹ Sean Van Leeuwen, “Cops Should Help Define the Use of Force Standards,” *Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs Blog* 2016, <http://myemail.constantcontact.com/Cops-Should-Help-Define-the-Use-of-Force-Standards.html?soid=1119707513166&aid=MrXSkgMHvXg>.

³⁰² Ibid.

APPENDIX A. SURVEY QUESTIONS

Note: This research was not formally reviewed by the NPS Human Research Protection Program Office & Institutional Review Board, but it was made aware of this work and approved publication without a formal review.

1. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.) ____
2. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.) ____
3. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons? ____
4. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices? ____
5. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray? ____
6. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation? ____
7. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention? ____
8. What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy? ____
9. What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state? ____
10. What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to correctly resolve the scenario? ____
11. What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario? ____
12. What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario? ____

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APPENDIX B. SURVEY RESPONSES

Return #1

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

56

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

58

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

8

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

Currently 4, but we are in the process of changing it to 6 hours

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

3, plus the practical exercise where the student is sprayed and must perform a series of tasks after being sprayed.

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

We do not teach “de-escalation” as a separate topic. It is incorporated into our use-of-force and interpersonal communication training.

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

12

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

4

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

42

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to correctly resolve the scenario?

10%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?

90%

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?

All of them have the potential to utilize such techniques.

Return #2

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

0

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

0

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

0

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

0

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

0

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

0

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

0

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

0

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

0

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?

5

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?

10

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?

5

Return #3

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

40

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

40

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

20

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

0

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

8

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

40

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

8

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

8

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

60+

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?

1-5%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?

5-10%

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?

85-95%

Return #4

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

80

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

80

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

40

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

N/A

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

8

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

8

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

16

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

24

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

800

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?

N/A

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?

N/A

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?

N/A

Return #5

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

60

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

70

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

8

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

0

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

0

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

20

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

20

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

6

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

Difficult to accurately determine

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?

Difficult to answer

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?

Difficult to answer

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?

Difficult to quantify

Return #6

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

47 hours

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

47 hours

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

4hours

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

0

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

2

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

8

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

4

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

8

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

16

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?
> 5%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?
> 20 %

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?
70%

Return #7

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

50 Hours minimum; almost all academies well over that

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

40 Hours min; most are over this number of hours

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

10 hours.

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

Nothing designated by the state and academy level

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

5 hours

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

approximately 20 in varies [*sic*] areas

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

approximately 10 hours in varied areas

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

approximately 15 hours in ares [*sic*] of Law of Arrest, DT, and Firearms

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

Respondent skipped this question

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?

Less than 10%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?

Less than 20%

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?

Majority, 70 %

Return #8

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

no specific number of hours mandaed [sic]

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

no specific number of hours mandated

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

see above

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

see above

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

see above

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

see above

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

see above

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

see above

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

see above

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?
less than 10%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?
less than 20%

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?
majority

Return #9

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

42

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

44.5

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

8.0

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

4

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

8

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

8

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

4

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

4

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

104

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?
10%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?
25%

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?
65%

Return #10

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

64

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

62

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

4

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

0

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

0

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

2

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

0

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

2

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

14

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?

Respondent skipped this question

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?

Respondent skipped this question

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?

Respondent skipped this question

Return #11

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

48

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

40

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?
included in the 40 in #3

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?
Not taught in academy

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?
Not taught in academy

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?
0

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?
4

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?
5

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?
120

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?
less than 5%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?
less than 5%

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?
85%

Return #12

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

72

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

70

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

minimum of 7 hours

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

0

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

3 hours - classroom only (no exposure)

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

0 as titled, but verbal skills, with physical alternatives are throughout the academy

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

5 hours of Mental Health training

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

0 - no single agencies UOF policy is taught

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

20 hours

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to correctly resolve the scenario?

varied

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?

varied

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?

varied

Return #13

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

66

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

62

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

4

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

none required

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

4

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

4

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

6

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

4

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

32

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?
2.5%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?
17.5%

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?
17.5%

Return #14

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

86 - not required but actual number being used

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

123 - not required but actual number being used

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

10 - not required but actual number being used

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

0

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

6 - not required but actual number being used

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

10+ - CIT, LEED, Excited Delirium

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

8 - CIT

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

4+ - not required but actual number being used

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

63 - not required but actual number being used

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to

correctly resolve the scenario?
less than 10%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?
less than 10%

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?
around 50%

Return #15

Q1: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Firearms? (safe-handling, cleaning, shooting, qualifying, etc.)

78.5

Q2: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Defensive Tactics? (inclusive of arrest techniques, ground fighting, Krav Maga, etc.)

65

Q3: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Impact weapons?

10

Q4: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Electronic Control Devices?

Zero

Q5: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on OC Spray?

3.5

Q6: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on De-escalation?

We train on the [sic] this concept throughout our interpersonal communications and other classes as well as our defense tactics, Firearms and Use of force.

Q7: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Crisis Intervention?

7

Q8: What is the required minimum number of training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state on Use of force policy?

10

Q9: What is the required minimum number of scenario based training hours taught to new law enforcement officers in your state?

60

Q10: What percentage of training scenarios requires the discharge of a firearm to correctly resolve the scenario?

10%

Q11: What percentage of training scenarios requires the use of force other than the discharge of a firearm, such as the use of an electronic control device, baton, or OC spray, to correctly resolve the scenario?

50%

Q12: What percentage of scenarios requires only de-escalation techniques to resolve the scenario?

5%

APPENDIX C. SURVEY STATISTICS

(* signifies a non-numeric answer)

Questions	Return 1	Return 2	Return 3	Return 4	Return 5
Firearms	56	0	40	80	60
Defensive Tactics	58	0	40	80	70
Impact weapons	8	0	20	40	8
ECD	4	0	0	*	0
OC spray	3	0	8	8	0
De-escalation	*	0	40	8	20
Crisis Intervention	12	0	8	6	20
U of F policy	4	0	8	24	6
Scenario hours	42	0	60	800	*
Firearms	10%	5%	5%	*	*
other weapon	90%	10%	10%	*	*
De-escalation	*	5%	95%	*	*

Questions	Return 6	Return 7	Return 8	Return 9	Return 10
Firearms	47	50	0	42	64
Defensive Tactics	47	40	0	44.5	62
Impact weapons	4	10	0	8	4
ECD	0	0	0	4	0
OC spray	2	5	0	8	0
De-escalation	8	20	0	8	2
Crisis Intervention	4	10	0	4	0
U of F policy	8	15	0	4	2
Scenario hours	16	skipped	0	104	14
Firearms	5%	10%	10%	10%	skipped
other weapon	20%	20%	20%	25%	skipped
De-escalation	70%	70%	*	65%	skipped

Questions	Return 11	Return 12	Return 13	Return 14	Return 15
Firearms	48	72	66	86	78.5
Defensive Tactics	40	70	62	123	65
Impact weapons	*	7	4	10	10
ECD	0	0	0	0	0
OC spray	0	3	4	6	3.5
De-escalation	0	*	4	10	*
Crisis Intervention	4	5	6	8	7
U of F policy	5	0	4	4	10
Scenario hours	120	20	32	63	60
Firearms	5%	*	2.5%	10%	10%
other weapon	5%	*	17.5%	10%	50%
De-escalation	85%	*	17.5%	50%	5%

Questions	Average	Median
Firearms	52.63333333	56
Defensive Tactics	53.43333333	58
Impact weapons	9.5	8
ECD	0.571428571	0
OC spray	3.366666667	3
De-escalation	10	8
Crisis Intervention	6.266666667	6
U of F policy	6.266666667	4
Scenario hours	102.3846154	42
Firearms	8%	10%
other weapon	25%	20%
De-escalation	51%	65%

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